There are different meanings associated with consequentialism and teleology. This causes confusion, and sometimes results in discussions based on misunderstandings rather than on substantial disagreements. To clarify this, we created a survey on the definitions of ‘consequentialism’ and ‘teleology’, which we sent to specialists in consequentialism. We broke down the different meanings of consequentialism and teleology into four component parts: Outcome-Dependence, Value-Dependence, Maximization, and Agent-Neutrality. Combining these components in different ways we distinguished six definitions, all of which are represented in the philosophical literature. We asked the respondents which definition is best for consequentialism and for teleology. The most popular definition of consequentialism was the one which accepted value-dependence, but not maximization and agent-neutrality. We therefore recommend the use of this meaning to avoid misunderstandings. The results for teleology were more problematic, with several respondents claiming they never use the term, or indicating that it is confusing.

This paper raises an objection to the retributive view of the death penalty. If we take a psychological approach about what morally mat-ters, our intuitions on retribution and merit could be significantly modified. The claim that death penalty is the fair retribution to certain kind of crimes presuppose in the executed the existence of an underlying entity which would remain identic to itself troughth all the diachronic subjective changes. If this entity does not exist, or if its continuity is not what matters, the retributive nature of the death penalty could be considerably reduced. Este artículo plantea una objeción a la perspectiva retributiva de la pena de muerte. Si adoptamos un criterio psicológico acerca de lo que es moralmente relevante en términos de autointerés, nuestras intuiciones sobre la retribución y el merecimiento podrían verse considerablemente modificadas. La consideración de que la pena de muerte es la justa retribución a cierta clase de delitos parece presuponer en el ejecutado la existencia de una entidad subyacente a todos los cambios subjetivos diacrónicos. Si no hay tal entidad, o si esta no es lo moralmente relevante, el carácter retributivo de la pena podría verse significativamente reducido.

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