If the logic of natural language negation were classical – a simple matter of true and false – then it would be a disaster to answer a question like Is this essay good? with Yes and no. The overwhelming majority of adults (N = 40) asked to resolve this apparent contradiction were found to do so by appealing to the structure of the essay (e.g. Its thesis was good but its argument was not). Three-year-olds (N = 24), when suitably prepared, also appealed to object structure to resolve a similar apparent contradiction. These results are discussed in relation to a non-classical logical model that can handle object structure.

Objects, in general, have structure; that is, they can be analyzed into parts. This gives rise to certain problems relating to predicate inheritance. For instance, an object may possess a property in part but not in whole (a borderline case) and different parts of an object may possess opposed properties, so that the object as a whole possesses neither (an unexcluded middle). Experiment 1 (N = 24) tested 3‐year‐olds' grasp of a borderline case, and Experiment 2 (N = 28) tested the ability of children as young as age 3 to grasp an unexcluded middle. Results suggest that children as young as the age of 3 possess a sophisticated ability to reason about the heritability of properties from parts to wholes. We discuss the results in relation to the basic interpretive structures available to young children, particularly object structure.

Ravid & Tolchinsky present a valuable framework for understanding the development of metalinguistic knowledge (i.e. grasp of language form as opposed to content). Although this framework makes an admirable contribution, we question the authors' emphasis on familiarity with written language as an enabling condition, and instead outline an approach that makes more obvious provision for cognitive foundations and early development. This approach attempts to locate the development of metalinguistic understanding within the context of domain-general and age-related changes in cognitive function – in particular, increases in the complexity of representational structures involved in conscious reflection.

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APPARENT CONTRADICTIONS, e.g. Did Susan like her supper? – Yes and no, involve asserting and denying the same proposition. They therefore violate the classical LAW OF NON-CONTRADICTION, suggesting the use of non-classical INTERPRETIVE STRUCTURES in natural language and reasoning. Experiment 1 explores the range of such interpretive structures available to adults (n = 24) in their reasoning about an apparent contradiction. Experiment 2 uses a similar task to study the emergence of these interpretive structures in young children's reasoning (3;6 to 8;4, n = 48). Results suggest an early facility with resolution strategies relating to OBJECT STRUCTURE (as in, Maybe Susan liked one part of supper but didn't like another part) and an initial tendency to focus on the negative by referring to it first (as in, Maybe Susan didn't like one part of supper but did like another part). We discuss the results in terms of the NATURAL LOGIC of objects and their properties, and the LOGICAL RESOURCES available to young children.