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This Research Report presents an initial attempt to apply the theory of counterfactual thinking to study the cognitive processes that underlie judgments of negligence. Subjects reviewed a summary of an appellate case involving a work accident and listed all the ways in which the accident could have been undone (mutated). Participants' evaluations of the defendant's behavior were influenced by the ease of mutation of the negligent act and other mutations of the defendant's behavior, but not by the number of mutations of the plaintiffs conduct. Exploratory path analysis suggested that counterfactual thinking may have its greatest impact not as a direct influence on verdicts and damages, but rather as an indirect influence impacting verdicts through lower level judgments about the normality of the defendant's behavior and the standard of care. T h e results also suggest that contrary to the law, subjects base their negligence verdicts on assessments of normal care along with due care.Negligence is a common theory that plaintiffs use to bring causes of action in tort. Although the prima facie case of ordinary negligence is well settled law, the cognitive processes by which people evaluate negligence claims are not well understood. The purpose of the present research was to use social cognitive theory (Markus & Zajonc, 1985) to inquire about how people integrate facts to make judgments about liability.Richard L. Wiener, Ph.D., M.L.S., is a professor of psychology and public policy; Maurido Gaborit, PhD, is an assistant profasor of psychology; Christine C. Pritchard is a graduate student currently pursuing a Master's Degree in psychology; Erin M. McDonough, M.S., is an advanced graduate student in social psychology; Caryn R. Staebler, M.S., is working on her dissertation in organizational psychology; Deane C. Wiley, M.S., is an advanced graduate student working on his dissertation in psychology and law; and Kristen S. Goldkamp, M.S., is an advanced graduate student working on her disserradon in psychology and law; all authors are at Saint Louis Univeaity. Address reprint requests and correspondence to Qr. Wiener, St.

Six hundred young adolescents (11 to 16 years old) from 4 countries (Guatemala, Iceland, Mexico, and the United States) ranked the importance of 10 qualities of the opposite-sex ideal person. Those from the United States responded in an individualistic fashion; they ranked being fun, being sexy, and having considerable money as important for the ideal. Those from Guatemala responded in a collectivistic fashion; they ranked liking children as important, but being fun and good looking as unimportant. Adolescents from Mexico and Iceland reported patterns of values not clearly associated with either collectivism or individualism.

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