Idiosyncrasies of Hobbes's composition process, together with a paucity of reliable autobiographical materials and the norms of seventeenth-century manuscript production, render interpretation of his political theory particularly difficult and contentious. These difficulties are surveyed here under three headings: (1) the process of "serial" composition (meaning the production of multiple, often expanded, versions of a work), which was common in the period; (2) the relationship between Hobbes's three political-theory textsthe Elements of Law, De Cive, and Leviathan, which is basic to defining the textual embodiment of his theory, and controversial; and (3) his method of writing. I argue that Hobbes's composition process undercut his intention to produce a deductive, logical theory of politics and opened the door to inconsistency and muddle in his arguments.

Trust" is not usually considered a Hobbesian concept, which is odd since it is central to the definition of a covenant. The key to understanding Hobbes's concept of trust is to be found in his account of conquest-"sovereignty by acquisition"-which is a heavily revised adaptation of the Roman justification of slavery. Hobbes introduces a distinction between servants, who are trusted with liberty, and imprisoned slaves. The servant/ master relationship involves mutual trust, an ongoing exchange of benefits (protection for service and obedience), and performance monitoring. In contrast to Quentin Skinner's and Philip Pettit's shared concentration on the contrast between slavery and freedom, I argue that the salient analogy is between servants and subjects.The trust relationship between subjects and the sovereign involves defined roles, limited absolutism, and accountability in the early-modern form of licensing subjects to switch political allegiance should a regime fail.

The phrasing of the title telegraphs the thesis of this essay: study of the history of political theory ought to be understood and approached as a branch of political studies. Prior to the postwar success of empirical political science, the view would have seemed unexceptional. But the need for a defense against the empiricist attack impelled many theorists to turn to theories of interpretation in search of a philosophical and methodological identity. A preoccupation with issues of interpretation now threatens the customary, political study of the tradition. This essay, written in defense of a political understanding of the field, identifies fundamental propositions distinguishing “political commentary” and suggests critical standards appropriate to the enterprise. It also criticizes two currently fashionable applications of interpretative theory to the study of politics, historicist commentary and hermeneutical political science.

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