No abstract

After discussing the distinction between artifacts and natural entities, and the distinction between artifacts and technology, the conditions of the traditional account of moral agency are identified. While computer system behavior meets four of the five conditions, it does not and cannot meet a key condition. Computer systems do not have mental states, and even if they could be construed as having mental states, they do not have intendings to act, which arise from an agentÕs freedom. On the other hand, computer systems have intentionality, and because of this, they should not be dismissed from the realm of morality in the same way that natural objects are dismissed. Natural objects behave from necessity; computer systems and other artifacts behave from necessity after they are created and deployed, but, unlike natural objects, they are intentionally created and deployed. Failure to recognize the intentionality of computer systems and their connection to human intentionality and action hides the moral character of computer systems. Computer systems are components in human moral action. When humans act with artifacts, their actions are constituted by the intentionality and efficacy of the artifact which, in turn, has been constituted by the intentionality and efficacy of the artifact designer. All three components -artifact designer, artifact, and artifact user -are at work when there is an action and all three should be the focus of moral evaluation.

Recently a number of well-known public figures have expressed concern about the future development of artificial intelligence (AI), by noting that AI could get out of control and affect human beings and society in disastrous ways. Many of these cautionary notes are alarmist and unrealistic, and while there has been some pushback on these concerns, the deep flaws in the thinking that leads to them have not been called out. Much of the fear and trepidation is based on misunderstanding and confusion about what AI is and can ever be. In this work we identify 3 factors that contribute to this "AI anxiety": an exclusive focus on AI programs that leaves humans out of the picture, confusion about autonomy in computational entities and in humans, and an inaccurate conception of technological development. With this analysis we argue that there are good reasons for anxiety about AI but not for the reasons typically given by AI alarmists.

ATIONS AROUND THE WORLD ARE IN THEprocess of making fundamental decisions about the future of their systems of online communication. The public discussions taking place are revealed in the visions of the future that are being put forth. In the U.S., we have Vice President Al Gore using the metaphor of "electronic superhighways of the nature" and seeing a national and global information infrastructure as the means by which the U.S. will emerge triumphant in global economic competition. We have John Barlow, Mitch Kapor, and the Electronic Frontier Foundation using a highly gendered metaphor of the new frontier-cyberspace-in which thugs, overzealous sheriffs, and the pioneers of the 21st century are fighting it out. We have visions of a new form of democracy emerging online as political alliances are formed and social movements gather force without mediation from mass media. ' We have visions of this evolving technology bringing into our homes the ultimate in entertainment choice together with the efficiency of being able to carry on all of our daily interactions with keystrokes and screens, such as shopping, working, job searching, and banking, among so many others.The visions sometime include the possibility of escape into Disney-like virtual worlds. These are all highly valueladen and interest-laden visions competing for our attention. While they are all possible, none of them is inevitable. Rather, they work as self-fulling prophecies: The vision we embrace will shape what we make of online communication.Online communication has been evolving and growingOne documented example is the protest against Lotus Development Corp.'s product Lotus Marketplace: Households. It was a CD-ROM marketing database containing information on 120 million U.S. citizens. The announcement of the product eventually led to Lotus's receiving thousands of letters from people requesting their names be removed from the database. Much of this was done via email directly to Lotus [4 111.

Modern information systems not only capture a seemingly endless amount of transactional data, but also tend to retain it for inde nite periods of time. We argue that privacy policies must address not only collection and access to transactional information, but also its timely disposal. One unintended side effect of data retention is the disappearance of social forgetfulness, which allows individuals a second chance, the opportunity for a fresh start in life. We examine three domains in which social policy has explicitly recognized the importance of such a principle: bankruptcy law, juvenile crime records, and credit reports. In each case, we frame the issue in terms of the social bene ts of forgetfulness, rather than in terms of individual privacy protection. We examine how different policy approaches to privacy might handle the retentionof data and propose a comprehensive policy that includes a variety of strategies. The broad conclusion of the article is that data retention and disposal should be addressed as a part of a broader and comprehensive policy approach, rather than in a piecemeal fashion or as an afterthought.