to-lhc-sharing-eco/> (using "sharing economy," "peer economy," and "collaborative consumption"). The "sharing economy" has come under increasing fire, both for its ostensible inaccuracy (it's really not about sharing) and for its unhclpfulncss (if it's not about sharing, then what is it about?).

conceptions of freedom, both deeply entrenched in American culture, explains why the concept of control has been both "faulty" and "sticky" when it comes to worker classification. Drawing on a first-of-its-kind body of ethnographic fieldwork among workers and policymakers across several sharing economy industries, this Article begins by showing how workers themselves conceptualize freedom as both non-interference and non-domination. It then goes on to show that both these conceptualizations of freedom also exist in case law and statutory law pertaining to work. In doing so, the Article demonstrates that there is no great divide between work law and work practices and that, if anything, the problem is that classification doctrine reflects and reinforces an irresolvable tension in the way lay and legal actors think about freedom at work.

Indian constitutional framers sought to tie their new state to ideas of modernity and liberalism by creating a government that would ensure citizens' rights while also creating the conditions for democratic citizenship. Balancing these two goals has been particularly challenging with regard to religion, as exemplified by the emergence of a peculiarly Indian understanding of secularism which requires the nonestablishment of religion but not the separation of religion and state. Supporters argue that this brand of secularism is best suited to the particular social and historical circumstances of independent India. This article suggests that the desire to separate religion and state is integral to any understanding of secularism and that, consequently, the Indian state neither is nor was meant to be secular. However, Indian secularists correctly identify the Indian state's distinctive approach to religion-state relations as appropriate to the Indian context and in keeping with India's constitutional goals.

Must all states have fixed constitutional identities? Does democracy necessarily entail citizen-sovereignty? This Article uses ethnographic data from India to argue that the answer to both questions is "no." In the aftermath of a massive stampede in 2011, the Kerala High Court initiated an overhaul of the complex executive, legislative, and judicial network that governs the famous Hindu temple at Sabarimala. The court's conflicting goals were to avoid further consolidating government authority over the temple and to further empower officials so that they could undertake needed reforms. Ultimately the court did both-and neither-in an instance of judicial balancing that reflects the two visions of sovereignty in India. On the one hand, Indian constitutional law and judicial practice reflect a conventional vision of sovereignty, in which sovereign authority is wholly vested in citizens and merely exercised on their behalf by the state. On the other hand, there exists a vision of "divided sovereignty" in which the state, as the agent of reform, has sovereign authority independent of citizens. The productive tension between these two visions, according to which sovereignty is both vested wholly in citizens and divided between citizens and state, is the dynamic equilibrium at the heart of Indian democracy.

While India possesses features conventionally associated with liberal democracies, it has lately been understood to suffer from “democratic backsliding”. Commentators have used descriptions like “authoritarianism”, “electoral autocracy”, “ethnic democracy” and “totalitarianism” to understand the current moment in Indian history. The framework of “autocratic legalism” illuminates the dynamics of centralization of power but there are also elements in the Indian experience that complicate this framework and reflect potentially unique features of the country’s democratic decline. These features can be attributed to the political rise and entrenchment of the Hindu nationalist ideology, profoundly facilitated by the electoral dominance of the Hindu right-wing Bharatiya Janata Party and Prime Minister Narendra Modi since 2014. This article argues that India’s spiral towards authoritarianism is also characterized by a range of disturbing and insidious developments beyond the centralization of state power, which are more concerned with majoritarian power seeping into everyday legality. The article considers three examples of such majoritarianism in everyday legality: the use of “anti-terror” laws against minorities and political opponents, policies driving towards the dispossession of minority citizenship, and the mobilization of the mob in ways that blur the lines separating the state from Hindu nationalist actors. These examples demonstrate how in India, autocratic forces are not merely interested in undermining (meaningful) democracy—all in the name of democracy. Instead, autocracy flourishes as a diverse and relatively disaggregated set of actors undermine democracy in the name of an ostensibly truer, Hindu, Indian nationhood.