We develop a formal model to understand the selection and influence effects of social proximity (homophily) between business partners. Consistent with the model's predictions, we find that U.S. venture capitalists (VCs) are more likely to select start-ups with coethnic executives for investment, particularly when the probability of the start-up's success appears low. Ethnic proximity between VCs and the start-ups they invest in is positively related to performance, measured by the probability of the companies' successful exit through acquisitions and initial public offerings (IPOs) and net income after IPO. Two-stage regression estimates suggest that these positive performance outcomes are largely due to influence, that is, superior communication and coordination between coethnic VCs and start-up executives after the investment. To the extent that VCs expect to work better with coethnic start-ups, they invest in coethnic ventures that are of lower observable quality than noncoethnic ventures. This paper was accepted by Lee Fleming, entrepreneurship and innovation.

In this paper, we study the effect of invention disclosure through patent publication on the market for ideas. We do so by analyzing the effects of the American Inventor's Protection Act of 1999 (AIPA)which required US patent applications to be published 18 months after their filing date rather than at patent grant-on the timing of licensing deals in the biomedical industry. We find that post-AIPA US patent applications are significantly more likely to be licensed before patent grant and shortly after 18month publication. Licensing delays are reduced by about ten months, on average, after AIPA's enactment. These findings suggest a hitherto unexplored benefit of the patent system: by requiring inventions to be published through a credible, standardized, and centralized repository, it mitigates information costs for buyers and sellers and, thus, facilitates transactions in the market for ideas.

We provide evidence on the value of patents to startups by leveraging the quasi‐random assignment of applications to examiners with different propensities to grant patents. Using unique data on all first‐time applications filed at the U.S. Patent Office since 2001, we find that startups that win the patent “lottery” by drawing lenient examiners have, on average, 55% higher employment growth and 80% higher sales growth five years later. Patent winners also pursue more, and higher quality, follow‐on innovation. Winning a first patent boosts a startup’s subsequent growth and innovation by facilitating access to funding from venture capitalists, banks, and public investors.

No abstract

No abstract