No abstract

In 2016, the European Parliament and the Council adopted a legislative act creating and regulating a new European Border and Coast Guard Agency. Its Article 19 states thatshould a Member State's failure to control its own borders jeopardize the collective effort to monitor the external borders of the Schengen Areathe new Agency could take over the management of border control operations in that Member-State. This transfer of power begs a crucial question regarding EU's conflict of sovereignties. First, this article identifies three paradigmatic conceptions of sovereignty (traditional, post-sovereignist, and posttraditional), and, second, it applies them to our case study to assess which conception provides the best explanatory model. We eventually argue that the post-traditional perspective proves the fittest to capture the current integration of the EU's external border management, best described as an institutional bricolage (by contrast with a grand architectonic design).

No abstract

No abstract

In 2016, the European Parliament and the Council adopted a legislative act creating and regulating a new European Border and Coast Guard Agency. Its Article 19 states thatshould a Member State's failure to control its own borders jeopardize the collective effort to monitor the external borders of the Schengen Areathe new Agency could take over the management of border control operations in that Member-State. This transfer of power begs a crucial question regarding EU's conflict of sovereignties. First, this article identifies three paradigmatic conceptions of sovereignty (traditional, post-sovereignist, and posttraditional), and, second, it applies them to our case study to assess which conception provides the best explanatory model. We eventually argue that the post-traditional perspective proves the fittest to capture the current integration of the EU's external border management, best described as an institutional bricolage (by contrast with a grand architectonic design).