Starburst99 is a comprehensive set of model predictions for spectrophotometric and related properties of galaxies with active star formation. The models are an improved and extended version of the data set previously published by Leitherer & Heckman (1995). We have upgraded our code by implementing the latest set of stellar evolution models of the Geneva group and the model atmosphere grid compiled by Lejeune et al. (1997). Several predictions which were not included in the previous publication are shown here for the first time. The models are presented in a homogeneous way for five metallicities between Z = 0.040 and 0.001 and three choices of the initial mass function. The age coverage is 10^6 to 10^9 yr. We also show the spectral energy distributions which are used to compute colors and other quantities. The full data set is available for retrieval at http://www.stsci.edu/science/starburst99/. This website allows users to run specific models with non-standard parameters as well. We also make the source code available to the community.Comment: 32 pages, LaTeX. All the Figures and the summary Table are located at http://www.stsci.edu/science/starburst99/, ApJ accepte

Balancing security, privacy, safety, and utility is a necessity in the health care domain, in which implantable medical devices (IMDs) and body area networks (BANs) have made it possible to continuously and automatically manage and treat a number of health conditions. In this work, we survey publications aimed at improving security and privacy in IMDs and health-related BANs, providing clear definitions and a comprehensive overview of the problem space. We analyze common themes, categorize relevant results, and identify trends and directions for future research. We present a visual illustration of this analysis that shows the progression of IMD/BAN research and highlights emerging threats. We identify three broad research categories aimed at ensuring the security and privacy of the telemetry interface, software, and sensor interface layers and discuss challenges researchers face with respect to ensuring reproducibility of results. We find that while the security of the telemetry interface has received much attention in academia, the threat of software exploitation and the sensor interface layer deserve further attention. In addition, we observe that while the use of physiological values as a source of entropy for cryptographic keys holds some promise, a more rigorous assessment of the security and practicality of these schemes is required.

Electromagnetic interference (EMI) affects circuits by inducing voltages on conductors. Analog sensing of signals on the order of a few millivolts is particularly sensitive to interference. This work (1) measures the susceptibility of analog sensor systems to signal injection attacks by intentional, low-power emission of chosen electromagnetic waveforms, and(2) proposes defense mechanisms to reduce the risks.Our experiments use specially crafted EMI at varying power and distance to measure susceptibility of sensors in implantable medical devices and consumer electronics. Results show that at distances of 1-2 m, consumer electronic devices containing microphones are vulnerable to the injection of bogus audio signals. Our measurements show that in free air, intentional EMI under 10 W can inhibit pacing and induce defibrillation shocks at distances up to 1-2 m on implantable cardiac electronic devices. However, with the sensing leads and medical devices immersed in a saline bath to better approximate the human body, the same experiment decreased to under 5 cm.Our defenses range from prevention with simple analog shielding to detection with a signal contamination metric based on the root mean square of waveform amplitudes. Our contribution to securing cardiac devices includes a novel defense mechanism that probes for forged pacing pulses inconsistent with the refractory period of cardiac tissue.

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