The mass arrival of Syrian refugees and their continuing presence have triggered many new debates regarding migration in Turkey, which – as a result of its open‐door policy – now hosts the highest number of refugees in the world. Yet, when we investigate the ways political institutions and actors have framed migration, we observe, unlike in European discourses, the complete absence of the word “crisis”. In public statements by politicians, “control” emerges instead as a recurrent (albeit implicit) theme. Here, management of the refugee issue becomes a sign of state power, exercised through various mechanisms. Through analysis of state discourse on Syrians in the Turkish media, we find that crisis framing has been deliberately avoided, which we contend is a sign of an implicit “silencing” via media control. This choice of discourse reflects a clear policy to manage public reactions to the mass arrival of refugees.

Within the context of the transformation of Turkey from a country of emigration to an immigration and transit country, the migration scene is becoming more heterogeneous, with both the formal and informal labor markets being increasingly internationalized. This paper focuses on de-qualification, defined as migrants taking on jobs that do not match their skills, which is a neglected issue within the migration literature on Turkey with the potential for further research. Based on open-ended interviews and participant observation in İstanbul, the paper elaborates on the different instruments of de-qualification. De-qualification is considered here as an important element of precariousness in the labor market, with different mechanisms functioning simultaneously; namely, accreditation problems, a language disadvantage, lack of information, and identity-based discrimination.

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Analytically speaking, migration involves a series of decisions. Put differently, it requires facing a range of altering circumstances and making choicesboth for the migrants themselves, and for the countries that find themselves impacted by migration. The contextual factors that underlie the various types and patterns of (non-forced or forced) migration differ dramatically. Nevertheless, from the perspective of the people who are doing the moving (especially across international borders), a common element is the decision to move itselfwhich is almost always taken after facing significant (economic, social, political) challengesplus decisions about where and how to move, and what to do after moving (de Jong and Gardner, 1981; Carling and Collins, 2017). And for migrants or refugees, once the post-migration stage is reachedtypically at the end of a difficult journey that has proceeded through many stagesdecision-making remains central; in debates over settlement, integration, naturalization and potential re-migration or return. Decision-making is also the concluding theme of receiving countries as they attempt to deal with the flows of migrants and/or refugees. The policy-making process is replete with difficult choices, including how to respond to the various claims of immigrants or refugees who enter, how long they might stay (i.e. permanently or temporarily), what kind of work (if any) they may undertake, their impact on the welfare system or the ability of migrants or refugees to "integrate" into the communities in which they live (Rousseau et al., 2002; Boswell et al., 2011). Needless to say, these decision-making and policy-making processes are all the harder in the context of forced mass movement, compared to voluntary migration. All these various aspects of "facing challenges and making choices" have been observed vividly in the last 8 years in the case of the millions of Syrian refugees who have been displaced internally or internationally. Since 2011, as many as a half of Syria's 22 million inhabitants have been forced to flee their homes, temporarily or permanently. Recent UN figures show that more than 6 million are internally displaced within Syria, and there are around 5 million refugees outside the country (UNHCR, 2018). The first wave of Syrian displacement came in April 2011, when hundreds died in clashes between the Syrian Army and opposition forces as the conflict erupted. By the end of 2011, with the country descending into full-scale civil war, thousands had fled to neighbouring countries, with even larger numbers displaced within Syria itself. Two years into the conflict, some 2.5 million Syrians had become refugees, mostly in Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan. By 2015, the number of Syrian refugees in these three neighbouring countries had grown to nearly 4 million-2.5 million in Turkey, nearly 1 million in Lebanon and half a million in Jordonin addition to another half million in other two countries in the region, Iraq and Egypt. In 2015, with the conflict in its fifth year and with no resolution ...

In the wake of the Syrian civil war, more than three million people have fled to Turkey, which now hosts the largest refugee population on earth. Making up 4.42 per cent of the total population in Turkey as of February 2018, Syrian refugees are nevertheless spread unevenly within its borders. The ratio of refugees to the local population ranges from as high as 99per cent in the city of Kilis to as low as 0.05per cent in Sinop. This article presents findings from the empirical study of the effect of this geographical variation on election outcomes in Turkey, after the arrival of major refugee populations in 2012. Drawing on a unique subnational dataset and ordinary least squares (OLS), generalized least squares (GLS), and difference‐in‐differences (DiD) regressions, the study compares cities hosting few refugees (control group) with cities with large refugee populations (treatment group) to determine whether significant differences in voting patterns emerged. Our findings show a negative, but insignificant, impact on the incumbent party. The findings have policy implications for Turkey as well as any country that experiences a considerable flow of refugees.