SummaryItalian capitalism has long been distinguished by the large size of the public enterprise sector and the power of large family firms, underpinned by powerful networks of inter-firm alliance orchestrated by the merchant bank, Mediobanca. This article seeks to analyse the extent to which the current programme of privatization is serving not only to shrink the size of, but to transform the structure of, power in the private sector. While some reformers have seen in privatization an instrument to encourage the adoption of Anglo-Saxon forms of corporate governance in Italy, it is argued here that the evidence of recent changes indicates the emergence of a more differentiated pattern of corporate governance rather than the triumph of any single model.

Economic globalization and European integration present major challenges to the regulatory systems of European states. However, notwithstanding the severity of these pressures, there is clear evidence that their impact is significantly mediated by the specific political and structural characteristics of individual states. What is less apparent is precisely which characteristics matter and how much room for manoeuvre states enjoy. Frequently, their role is conceptualized in terms of a choice between liberal accommodation or conservative protectionism. However, an analysis of bank reform in Italy, and the role of the Bank of Italy in particular, suggests that an appreciation of the enduring regulatory capabilities of states is necessary if the complex pattern of reform outcomes is to be understood.

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