Cognitive phenomenology refers to the idea that our subjective experiences include deliberative thought processes and high-level cognition. The recent ascendance of cognitive phenomenology in philosophy has important implications for biologically-inspired cognitive architectures and the role that these models can play in understanding the fundamental nature of consciousness. To the extent that cognitive phenomenology occurs, it provides a new route to a deeper understanding of consciousness via neurocomputational studies of cognition. This route involves identifying computational correlates of consciousness in neurocomputational models of high-level cognitive functions that are associated with subjective mental states. Here we develop this idea and compile a summary of potential neurocomputational correlates of consciousness that have been proposed/recognized during the last several years based on biologically-inspired cognitive architectures. We conclude that the identification and study of computational correlates of consciousness will lead to a better understanding of phenomenal consciousness, a framework for creating a conscious machine, and a better understanding of the mind-brain problem in general.

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Both Husserl and Sartre speak of quasi-presence in their descriptions of the lived experience of imagination, and for both philosophers, accounting for quasi-presence means developing an account of the hyle proper to imagination. Guided by the perspective of fulfillment, Husserl’s theory of imaginary quasi-presence goes through three stages. Having experimented first with a depiction-model and then a perception-model, Husserl’s mature theory appeals to his innovative conception of inner consciousness. This elegant account nevertheless fails to do justice to the facticity and bodily involvement of our imaginary experience. Sartre’s theory of analogon, based on his conception of imaginary quasi-presence as ‘magical’ self-affection, embodies important insights on these issues. Kinesthetic sensations and feelings are the modes in which we make use of own body to possess and be possessed by the imaginary object, thus lending it a semblance of bodily presence.

Abstract-Web page classification has wide applications. Due to various types of web pages and vast amounts of network traffic, it is difficult to classify web pages by deeply inspecting the content of each packet. This paper presents a learning-based classification method according to TCP/IP header features. First, we propose an approach to select features and improve the Relief algorithm, which can pick features with robustness. Then we raise a labeling strategy to assign each feature with a label when training the classifier. Last, we put forward a learning-based classification method which takes labels and multi-layer semantics into consideration. The experiment results show that the proposed strategy can improve the processing speed and the accuracy of classification.

This paper approaches Husserl's analysis of time-consciousness from a mereological perspective. Taking as inspiration Bergson's idea that pure durée is a multiplicity of interpenetration, I will show, from within Husserlian phenomenology, that the absolute flow can indeed be described as a whole of interpenetrating parts. This mereological perspective will inform my re-consideration of the much-discussed issue of Husserl's self-criticism concerning the schema of content and apprehension. It will also reveal a fundamental similarity between Husserl's conception of the absolute flow and Sartre's conception of lived temporality. This paper consists of four sections. Section 2 presents the basic elements of Husserl's mereology. Section 3 introduces the difficulty encountered by Husserl's early account of time that makes use of the schema. I will examine Barry Dainton's criticism of Husserl's theory of time-consciousness against the background of the older debate between Meinong and Stern, a debate that has informed Husserl's own account. Section 4 distinguishes two common (but misguided) criticisms of the schema from Husserl's own selfcriticism, which is in turn divided into two steps. It is shown how the second step of this self-criticism implies the interpenetration of the absolute flow and responds to Dainton's criticism. Finally, Sect. 5 concludes with some comparative remarks. I will show how Husserl's notion of absolute flow, as mereologically interpreted, anticipates Sartre's conception of consciousness as self-transcendence, as well as how it accommodates the apparently conflicting mereological intuitions of Aristotle and Bergson.