We engage with the practice of yoga in Californian public schools through a recent case to examine the discursive mechanisms at play when a practice is shaped as religious (or not). A correlation is made between the practice of yoga in schools and male circumcision, to think about its secular/religious vocation. This line of questioning is salient in exploring how law curates the body of the “secular” “modern” child. We argue that yoga, like circumcision, is an example of an ambidextrous practice that can be curated as either “religious” or “secular”. Section 1 provides a brief genesis of our legal cases and theoretical proposal for secularism as a curating practice. Section 2 offers discursive analyses of religious practice, as well as culture and health through yoga’s postures. Ultimately, we seek to critically examine the manner, mechanisms and methods through which different practices exercised by children or on their bodies are (re)shaped by/through the courts.

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Arbiter of religious dogma,'' first expressed by the Supreme Court of Canada in Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem ([2004] 2 SCR 551), has had a lasting and pervasive effect on the Canadian lawscape. Developed in an effort to remove the State (and therefore Court apparatus) from a decision-making capacity in questions related to religious doctrine, this expression has become an inevitable mantra when discussing issues related to religion in Canada. This article argues, however, that the presence of this expression should not be understood as the end of a conversation, but rather, the beginning of a novel one on the legitimacy of religion in law. Through discourse analysis, this article will endeavor to suggest that this ''marriage march'' between law and religion is inevitable in the Canadian context.Ré sumé : L'expression « arbitre des dogmes religieux », tel que proposée et discutée par la Cour suprême du Canada dans Syndicat Northcrest c. Amselem ([2004] 2 RCS 551), conserve un rô le déterminant dans le paysage juridique canadien. Cet aphorisme établit la délivrance judiciaire de l'État (et de l'appareil judiciaire) de la charge de déterminer le contenu des questions reliées au dogme religieux. Cet article soutient que la présence de cette expression ne signale pas la fin mais bien l'ouverture d'une conversation que l'on pourrait qualifier de novatrice quant à la légitimité de la religion en droit. À travers une analyse de discours, cet article explique comment cette « marche nuptiale » révèle plutôt un dialogue fondateur sur la légitimité de la religion en droit au Canada.