According to the theory of conceptual metaphor, image-schemas and primary metaphors are preconceptual structures configured in human cognition, based on sensory-motor environmental activity. Focusing on the way both non-conceptual structures are embedded in early social interaction, we provide empirical evidence for the interactive and intersubjective ontogenesis of image-schemas and primary metaphors. We present the results of a multimodal image-schematic microanalysis of three interactive infant-directed performances (the composition of movement, touch, speech, and vocalization that adults produce for-and-with the infants). The microanalyses show that adults aesthetically highlight the image-schematic structures embedded in the multimodal composition of the performance, and that primary metaphors are also lived as embedded in these inter-enactive experiences. The findings allow corroborating that the psychological domains of cognition and affection are not in rivalry or conflict but rather intertwined in meaningful experiences.

En este artículo examinaremos un caso de aplicación de la hipótesis de la relatividad lingüística (HRL): la influencia del género gramatical de las lenguas sobre la cognición o el pensamiento de los hablantes. Dado que las lenguas difieren tanto en sus repertorios léxicos como sobre todo en sus gramáticas de género para referir a las personas, a otras entidades animadas e incluso a entidades inanimadas, nuestro propósito será, en primer lugar, revisar la evidencia experimental reciente que avalaría la HRL en este dominio, al comprobar una variedad de impactos cognitivos y psicológicos, variables según las lenguas de los hablantes. En particular, identificaremos cuáles son los “efectos relativistas” en el caso de los rasgos morfosintácticos de las lenguas con carga de género, y en relación con la universalización del género masculino. Sobre la base de la evaluación realizada e incorporando los aportes de los estudios de “género y lenguaje” de los enfoques feministas, concluiremos señalando de qué diversas maneras es viable e importante promover usos inclusivos del lenguaje e incluso cambios más profundos hacia un lenguaje inclusivo, con especial referencia al español.

No abstract

The aim of this paper is to explore the hypothesis that mental concepts are natural kind concepts. By ‘mental concepts’ I mean the ordinary words belonging to our everyday languages (English, Spanish, and so on) that we use in order to describe our mental life. The plan of the paper is as follows. In the first part, I shall present the hypothesis: firstly, I shall present a theory about the meaning of natural kind concepts following Putnam's 1975 proposal, with some modifications; secondly, I shall present a taxonomy of mental concepts and, thirdly, I shall explain what the meaning of each kind of mental concept would be on the hypothesis defended in this paper. In the second part of the paper, I shall present two interesting consequences of the hypothesis proposed: first, that it is preferable to avoid a certain way of conceiving phenomenal concepts which does not fit with the hypothesis proposed; second, that folk psychology could fruitfully be considered a theory, and why, ultimately, it will not be eliminated.