Introduction: Two thirds of countries globally are unprepared to respond to a health emergency as per the International Health Regulations ( 2005), with conflict-affected countries like Syria being particularly vulnerable. Political influences on outbreak preparedness, response and reporting may also adversely affect control of SARS-CoV-2 in Syria. Syria reported its first case on 22 March 2020; however, concerns were raised that this was delayed and that underreporting continues. Discussion: Syria's conflict has displaced more than half of its pre-war population, leaving 6.7 million people internally displaced. The consequent overcrowdingwith insufficient water, sanitation and healthcare (including laboratory capacity)could lead to conditions that are ideal for spread of SARS-CoV-2 in Syria. Political changes have led to the formation of at least three health systems within Syria's borders, each with its own governance, capacity and planning. This fragmentation, with little interaction between them, could lead to poor resource allocation and adversely affect control. As such, COVID-19 could overwhelm the health systems (particularly intensive care capacity), leading to high deaths across the population, particularly for the most vulnerable such as detainees. Conclusions: Locally implementable interventions that rapidly build WASH and health system capacity are required across Syria to ensure early detection and management of COVID-19 cases.

Without healthcare workers (HCWs), health and humanitarian provision in Syria cannot be sustained either now or in the post-conflict phase. The protracted conflict has led to the exodus of more than 70% of the healthcare workforce. Those remaining work in dangerous conditions with insufficient resources and a healthcare system that has been decimated by protracted conflict. For many HCWs, particularly those in non-government-controlled areas (NGCAs) of Syria, undergraduate education and postgraduate training has been interrupted with few opportunities to continue. In this manuscript, we explore initiatives present in north west Syria at both undergraduate and postgraduate level for physician and non-physician HCWs. Conclusion: Challenges to HCW education in north west Syria can be broadly divided into 1. Organisational (local healthcare leadership and governance, coordination and collaboration between stakeholders, competition between stakeholders and insufficient funding.) 2. Programmatic (lack of accreditation or recognition of qualifications, insufficient physical space for teaching, exodus of faculty affecting teaching and training, prioritisation of physicians over non-physicians, informally trained healthcare workers.) 3. Healthcare system related (politicisation of healthcare system, changing healthcare needs of the population, ongoing attacks on healthcare.) Locally implementable strategies including dedicated funding are key to supporting retention of HCWs and return during post-conflict reconstruction.

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ObjectivesTo explore the impact of the conflict, including the use of chemical weapons, in Syria on healthcare through the experiences of health providers using a public health and human rights lens.DesignA qualitative study using semi-structured interviews conducted in-person or over Skype using a thematic analysis approach.SettingInterviews were conducted with Syrian health workers operating in opposition-held Syria in cooperation with a medical relief organisation in Gaziantep, Turkey.ParticipantsWe examined data from 29 semi-structured in-depth interviews with a sample of health professionals with current or recent work-related experience in opposition-controlled areas of Syria, including respondents to chemical attacks.ResultsFindings highlight the health worker experience of attacks on health infrastructure and services in Syria and consequences in terms of access and scarcity in availability of essential medicines and equipment. Quality of services is explored through physicians’ accounts of the knock-on effect of shortages of equipment, supplies and personnel on the right to health and its ethical implications. Health workers themselves were found to be operating under extreme conditions, in particular responding to the most recent chemical attacks that occurred in 2017, with implications for their own health and mental well-being.ConclusionsThe study provides unique insight into the impact war has had on Syrian’s right to health through the accounts of a sample of Syrian health professionals, with continuing relevance to the current conflict and professional issues facing health workers in conflict settings.

BackgroundViolent attacks on and interferences with hospitals, ambulances, health workers, and patients during conflict destroy vital health services during a time when they are most needed and undermine the long-term capacity of the health system. In Syria, such attacks have been frequent and intense and represent grave violations of the Geneva Conventions, but the number reported has varied considerably. A systematic mechanism to document these attacks could assist in designing more protection strategies and play a critical role in influencing policy, promoting justice, and addressing the health needs of the population.Methods and findingsWe developed a mobile data collection questionnaire to collect data on incidents of attacks on healthcare directly from the field. Data collectors from the Syrian American Medical Society (SAMS), using the tool or a text messaging system, recorded information on incidents across four of Syria’s northern governorates (Aleppo, Idleb, Hama, and Homs) from January 1, 2016, to December 31, 2016. SAMS recorded a total of 200 attacks on healthcare in 2016, 102 of them using the mobile data collection tool. Direct attacks on health facilities comprised the majority of attacks recorded (88.0%; n = 176). One hundred and twelve healthcare staff and 185 patients were killed in these incidents. Thirty-five percent of the facilities were attacked more than once over the data collection period; hospitals were significantly more likely to be attacked more than once compared to clinics and other types of healthcare facilities. Aerial bombs were used in the overwhelming majority of cases (91.5%). We also compared the SAMS data to a separate database developed by Physicians for Human Rights (PHR) based on media reports and matched the incidents to compare the results from the two methods (this analysis was limited to incidents at health facilities). Among 90 relevant incidents verified by PHR and 177 by SAMS, there were 60 that could be matched to each other, highlighting the differences in results from the two methods. This study is limited by the complexities of data collection in a conflict setting, only partial use of the standardized reporting tool, and the fact that limited accessibility of some health facilities and workers and may be biased towards the reporting of attacks on larger or more visible health facilities.ConclusionsThe use of field data collectors and use of consistent definitions can play an important role in the tracking incidents of attacks on health services. A mobile systematic data collection tool can complement other methods for tracking incidents of attacks on healthcare and ensure the collection of detailed information about each attack that may assist in better advocacy, programs, and accountability but can be practically challenging. Comparing attacks between SAMS and PHR suggests that there may have been significantly more attacks than previously captured by any one methodology. This scale of attacks suggests that targeting of healthcare in Syria is systematic and...