In this paper, adaptive logics are studied from the viewpoint of universal logic (in the sense of the study of common structures of logics). The common structure of a large set of adaptive logics is described. It is shown that this structure determines the proof theory as well as the semantics of the adaptive logics, and moreover that most properties of the logics can be proved by relying solely on the structure, viz. without invoking any specific properties of the logics themselves.

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Abstract. It is shown that the (flat) consequence relations defined from the Rescher-Manor Mechanism (that is: in terms of maximal consistent subsets of the premises) are all inconsistency-adaptive logics combined with a specific interpretation schema for the premises. Each of the adaptive logics is obtained by applying a suitable adaptive strategy to the paraconsistent logic CLuN.This result provides all those consequence relations with a (dynamic) proof theory and with a static (as well as a dynamic) semantics. Aim of this paperMany inconsistency handling mechanisms are inspired by the idea that inconsistent sets of sentences may be divided into maximally consistent subsets -henceforth MCS, and that what 'follows' from the inconsistent set may be defined, along more or less complex lines, in terms of the classical consequences of these subsets. To the best of my knowledge, the idea was first applied in [20]. The application was a specific one (mainly counterfactuals). Nevertheless, many ideas that became popular later were already present. For example, Rescher clearly distinguishes between the recognition * Research for this paper was supported by subventions from the Fund for Scientific Research -Flanders, and indirectly by the INTAS-RFBR contract 95-365. I am indebted to Kristof De Clercq and Liza Verhoeven for locating mistakes in an earlier draft.

This paper presents and illustrates a formal logic for the abduction of singular hypotheses. The logic has a semantics and a dynamic proof theory that is sound and complete with respect to the semantics. The logic presupposes that, with respect to a specific application, the set of explananda and the set of possible explanantia are disjoint (but not necessarily exhaustive). Where an explanandum can be explained by different explanantia, the logic allows only for the abduction of their disjunction.