Recent studies on the subnational resource curse contend that subnational rentier units suffer from the same nondemocratic tendency as their national counterparts. However, subnational rentier states worldwide exhibit contrasting political outcomes. Why are some subnational rentier units politically competitive whereas others are not? This article argues that rent-sharing regimes—the fiscal institutions for sharing resource revenues among levels of government—condition political competitiveness at the provincial level. Using novel time-series cross-sectional data on Argentina, a case with several hydrocarbon-rich units with exogenously created rent-sharing regimes, I show that oil creates negative political effects at the provincial level only when these institutions do not share—or share minor amounts of—rents with municipal governments. Conversely, political competition emerges when rent-sharing regimes distribute rents to municipal governments, as this shrinks large provincial budgets, allows municipalities to deliver public and private goods, and gives municipal politicians fiscal independence from provincial governments.

While women are underrepresented in politics, recent improvements in women's representation in legislative and executive bodies have spurred academic interest in the effects of electing women on a wide array of outcomes. Effects on bureaucracies, however, have received less attention. Do women mayors reform local bureaucracies differently than their men counterparts? We take advantage of rich administrative data from Chile to explore the effects of having a woman mayor on the size and gender composition of municipal bureaucracies. Using a regression discontinuity design in close electoral races, we find that women mayors reduce the size of local bureaucracies while simultaneously increasing the share of women public employees. Our findings thus show that women mayors' approach to bureaucratic reform once in office differs from that of their men counterparts, and contribute to existing research on the consequences of electing women.

Extant research on rentierism claims that oil royalties and unconditional transfers are among the main factors sustaining subnational undemocratic regimes (SURs). This article claims that these revenues are insufficient to economically reproduce SUR, as subnational rentier states generally overspend beyond their means. Drawing on evidence from Argentina, we identify two pathways to SUR reproduction. First, rulers in resource-rich provinces rely on 'hidden rents' from local extractive industries to sustain long-term spending. Second, rulers in resource-poor provinces heavily subsidised by fiscal institutions resort to discretionary grants from presidents to reproduce their political regimes.

Existing research is inconclusive regarding the longer-term economic effects of earthquakes. We examine the medium-run impacts of the 2010 earthquake in Chile, the sixth-largest ever recorded, using value-added tax collection as a proxy for economic activity at the municipal level and a measure of local ground-shaking intensity. We find that the affected municipalities suffered a relevant and persistent drop in their economic activity of about 10%, 8–9 years after the event. We discuss the plausibility of the assumption of conditional parallel trends and show that the overall results are robust to using alternative estimation methods.

Subnational governments are generally funded by fiscal rents, that is, transfers of centrally levied taxes. Existing literature concurs that fiscal federalism breeds rentierism and, consequently, hinders subnational democracy. However, in Argentina, fiscal rents do not always lead to low provincial contestation. Building on research on oil-based rentierism and fiscal federalism, we argue that this variation results from the provincial fiscal institutions that distribute central-government transfers from the province to municipalities. Specifically, we claim that as provincial fiscal institutions decentralize fiscal rents from the province to municipalities, they empower mayors to challenge governors. Conversely, as these institutions centralize rents at the province, they empower governors and weaken opposition from below. Using panel data and a comparison between Tierra del Fuego and Santa Cruz—the provinces that receive the largest fiscal transfers—we show that the effect of fiscal rents on incumbent party advantage decreases and eventually disappears as institutions become province-decentralizing.