Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to explain the impact of the incentives of competition authorities concerning antitrust enforcement on the structure of enforcement and understanding of the substantive norms and welfare standards in Russia using case-level evidence. Design/methodology/approach – The study is based on a unique data set of appeals to infringement decisions in 2008-2012. Quantitative and qualitative analyses are applied to derive an understanding of the targets of competition policy in the practice of enforcement. Findings – The analysis reveals that the majority of cases would never be investigated under conventional understanding of the goals of antitrust enforcement. It is also shown that antitrust authorities tend to investigate cases that require less input but result in infringement decisions with lower probability of being annulled and lower cost to proceed. Structure of enforcement is skewed toward cases where harm serves as independent and sufficient evidence of competition law violation. Originality/value – The results show that it is dangerous to motivate authority and public servants based either on number of tasks completed or completeness of tasks when they are heterogeneous in terms of difficulty and where easier ones provide lower positive effects on welfare. Judicial reviews may poorly contribute to performance measurement under a discretionary choice of enforcement targets.

No abstract

No abstract

Paper is devoted to the analysis of impact of foreign trade and antitrust policies on development of competition and the position of domestic buyers of Russian metal products. It presents a stylized description of the development of the Russian metallurgy over 25-year period, considering the peculiarities of industry, which influence the problems of competition policy; paper describes the application of competition and foreign trade policies in the industry, taking into account relationships with industry structure. It illustrates the problem of trade-off between an increased competitiveness in world market and consumers protection within the country in relation to industries with the dominance of large exporters. The analysis revealed contradictions in pursued policy: approval of mergers that might restrict competition in the markets of metal products in Russia, and relatively high level of import protection are not consistent with regular investigations of violation of antitrust legislation by Russian metal producers, based on harm imposed to domestic consumers.

The article assesses single wholesale network (SWN) model - concentration of access to key infrastructure facilities within one company - for developing 5G. The main argument in favor of SWN is the possible capex savings, which are highly relevant in Russia. But setting up SWN will require state regulation which implies additional costs. The article shows limitations for SWN’s efficiency presenting quantitative analysis of the consequences associated with the SWN’s incentives to inflate capex, regulation inefficiency, guaranteeing non-discriminatory access as well as additional costs to comply with state procurement rules. The methodology may be used for regulatory impact assessment that make the article especially valuable in analysis of state intervention.