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This paper reviews theoretical models of network competition in telecommunications. We will discuss two alternative approaches. The first approach assumes Hoteling?s horizontal differentiation and the second approach is based on switching costs. We will first analyse spatial competition with linear prices and continue with price discrimination between on-net and off-net calls. Price discrimination can also be used to deter entry to the market. We will also deal with the regulator?s optimal choice of access price, which should be designed to induce entry of new firms. Furthermore, pricing of roaming services and the switching cost approach to network competition will be considered. Finally, we will illustrate the theoretical results with data from the Serbian mobile and fixed telephony market.

European continent is very diverse in physical, demographic, economic and social aspects. During the past times different processes shaped European continent producing different economic environment across the whole continent. Economic regionalisation is complex in particular due to economic space dynamism. This made regional disparities within existing geographical regions so big that changeability of economic regions boundaries could not be overlooked. The paper provides a completely new aspect of the economic regionalization, using Data Envelopment Analysis method (DEA). Some relevant economic (financial and macroeconomic stability), demographic and social indicators have been chosen to calculate composite index (Regional Development Index-RDI), considering each of these categories through calculated sub-indexes. The given methodology is developed for the purpose of revealing regional disparities within existing European economic regions and provides an excellent tool for evaluating efficiency of possible regional and economic policies.

There are two types of switching costs when users change their mobile operator. The first stems from price discrimination when the network charges a lower price for on-net than for off-net calls. If the majority of the switching user?s contacts are in their current network, this imposes an obstacle to changing the network, since in the new network they would have to pay a higher price for off-net calls. The other switching cost results from the switching user having to inform all their contacts about their new number in the other network. Mobile phone number portability (NP) reduces this switching cost. This paper?s aim is to determine pro-competitive regulatory policies for the post-paid and pre-paid market segments. This distinction is important since the post-paid market dominates in developed countries, while in less developed countries the prepaid market dominates. There are two operators in our model, the incumbent and a new entrant. In the postpaid market, NP reduces the level of market concentration. In the pre-paid market, NP has no impact on the convergence of market shares, and the reduction of access charges (the fee for terminating calls in the rival network) turns out to be a pro-competitive regulatory policy. There is no need for asymmetric access regulation where the incumbent pays higher access charges than the new entrant.