The current US oil and gas boom is injecting labour, capital and revenue into communities near reserves. Will these communities be cursed with lower long‐run incomes in the wake of the boom? We study the oil boom‐and‐bust cycle of the 1970s and 1980s to gain insights. Using annual data on drilling to identify western boom‐and‐bust counties, we find substantial positive local employment and income effects during the boom. In the aftermath of the bust, however, we find that incomes per capita decreased and unemployment compensation payments increased relative to what they would have been if the boom had not occurred.

American Indian reservations are islands of poverty in a sea of wealth. Because this poverty cannot be explained solely by natural resource, physical, and human capital constraints, institutions are likely to be part of the explanation. One of the institutional variables is the sovereign power of tribes, which allows tribal governments to act opportunistically. The potential for such opportunistic behavior can thwart economic development if tribes are unable to make credible commitments to stable contract enforcement. One avenue for credible commitments is Public Law 280, which required some tribes to turn judicial jurisdiction over civil disputes to the states in which they reside. Using data for 1969-99, we find that per capita income for American Indians on reservations subject to state jurisdiction grew significantly more than it did for Indians who were not. (c) 2008 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved..

There is widespread belief that civil conflict in poorly governed countries is triggered by surging international demand for their natural resources. We study the consequences of U.S. legislation grounded in this belief, the "conflict minerals" section of the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act. Targeting the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, it cuts funding to warlords by discouraging manufacturers from sourcing tin, tungsten, and tantalum from the region. Building from Mancur Olson's stationary bandit metaphor, we describe some channels through which the legislation could backfire, inciting violence. Using geo-referenced data, we find the legislation increased looting of civilians, and shifted militia battles towards unregulated gold mining territories. These findings are a cautionary tale about the possible unintended consequences of imposing boycotts, trade embargoes, and resource certification schemes on war-torn regions.

Are victims of human rights abuses better off with or without economic sanctions targeted at their perpetrators? We study this question in the context of a U.S. human rights policy, Section 1502 of the 2010 Dodd Frank Act. By discouraging companies from sourcing 'conflict minerals' from the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, the policy has acted as a de facto boycott on mineral purchases that may finance warlords and armed militias. We estimate the policy's impact on mortality outcomes of children born prior to 2013 and find that it increased the probability of infant deaths in villages near the regulated 'conflict mineral' deposits by at least 143 percent. We find suggestive evidence that the legislation-induced boycott did so by stunting mother consumption of infant health care goods and services.

Despite compelling evidence that property rights–based management can improve the economic and ecological performance of fisheries, reform proposals are often met with political opposition. Moreover, the opposition sometimes comes from incumbent fishermen and fishing communities that would ostensibly gain the most from rent-enhancing reforms. We flesh out this puzzle by describing the political economy of past and present institutional changes in North America such as bans on fish traps, limited-entry regulations, and individual transferable quotas (ITQs). Our review identifies patterns of distributional concerns surrounding property rights; many of the same groups that opposed limits on entry and fish traps also oppose ITQs. We provide examples of how political opposition to ITQs is mollified by modifications in program design, although these design compromises may have efficiency costs. We conclude by pointing to the need for more research on equity-efficiency trade-offs and for greater attention to fishermen heterogeneity in economic analysis.