The speed–accuracy trade-off (SAT) is ubiquitous in decision tasks. While the neural mechanisms underlying decisions are generally well characterized, the application of decision-theoretic methods to the SAT has been difficult to reconcile with experimental data suggesting that decision thresholds are inflexible. Using a network model of a cortical decision circuit, we demonstrate the SAT in a manner consistent with neural and behavioral data and with mathematical models that optimize speed and accuracy with respect to one another. In simulations of a reaction time task, we modulate the gain of the network with a signal encoding the urgency to respond. As the urgency signal builds up, the network progresses through a series of processing stages supporting noise filtering, integration of evidence, amplification of integrated evidence, and choice selection. Analysis of the network's dynamics formally characterizes this progression. Slower buildup of urgency increases accuracy by slowing down the progression. Faster buildup has the opposite effect. Because the network always progresses through the same stages, decision-selective firing rates are stereotyped at decision time.

Decisions are faster and less accurate when conditions favor speed, and are slower and more accurate when they favor accuracy. This phenomenon is referred to as the speed-accuracy trade-off (SAT). Behavioral studies of the SAT have a long history, and the data from these studies are well characterized within the framework of bounded integration. According to this framework, decision makers accumulate noisy evidence until the running total for one of the alternatives reaches a bound. Lower and higher bounds favor speed and accuracy respectively, each at the expense of the other. Studies addressing the neural implementation of these computations are a recent development in neuroscience. In this review, we describe the experimental and theoretical evidence provided by these studies. We structure the review according to the framework of bounded integration, describing evidence for (1) the modulation of the encoding of evidence under conditions favoring speed or accuracy, (2) the modulation of the integration of encoded evidence, and (3) the modulation of the amount of integrated evidence sufficient to make a choice. We discuss commonalities and differences between the proposed neural mechanisms, some of their assumptions and simplifications, and open questions for future work. We close by offering a unifying hypothesis on the present state of play in this nascent research field.

Our actions take place in space and time, but despite the role of time in decision theory and the growing acknowledgement that the encoding of time is crucial to behaviour, few studies have considered the interactions between neural codes for objects in space and for elapsed time during perceptual decisions. The speed-accuracy trade-off (SAT) provides a window into spatiotemporal interactions. Our hypothesis is that temporal coding determines the rate at which spatial evidence is integrated, controlling the SAT by gain modulation. Here, we propose that local cortical circuits are inherently suited to the relevant spatial and temporal coding. In simulations of an interval estimation task, we use a generic local-circuit model to encode time by ‘climbing’ activity, seen in cortex during tasks with a timing requirement. The model is a network of simulated pyramidal cells and inhibitory interneurons, connected by conductance synapses. A simple learning rule enables the network to quickly produce new interval estimates, which show signature characteristics of estimates by experimental subjects. Analysis of network dynamics formally characterizes this generic, local-circuit timing mechanism. In simulations of a perceptual decision task, we couple two such networks. Network function is determined only by spatial selectivity and NMDA receptor conductance strength; all other parameters are identical. To trade speed and accuracy, the timing network simply learns longer or shorter intervals, driving the rate of downstream decision processing by spatially non-selective input, an established form of gain modulation. Like the timing network's interval estimates, decision times show signature characteristics of those by experimental subjects. Overall, we propose, demonstrate and analyse a generic mechanism for timing, a generic mechanism for modulation of decision processing by temporal codes, and we make predictions for experimental verification.

Humans vary greatly in their motor learning abilities, yet little is known about the neural processes that underlie this variability. We identified distinct profiles of human sensorimotor adaptation that emerged across 2 days of learning, linking these profiles to the dynamics of whole-brain functional networks early on the first day when cognitive strategies toward sensorimotor adaptation are believed to be most prominent. During early learning, greater recruitment of a network of higher-order brain regions, involving prefrontal and anterior temporal cortex, was associated with faster learning. At the same time, greater integration of this “cognitive network” with a sensorimotor network was associated with slower learning, consistent with the notion that cognitive strategies toward adaptation operate in parallel with implicit learning processes of the sensorimotor system. On the second day, greater recruitment of a network that included the hippocampus was associated with faster learning, consistent with the notion that declarative memory systems are involved with fast relearning of sensorimotor mappings. Together, these findings provide novel evidence for the role of higher-order brain systems in driving variability in adaptation.

Humans vary greatly in their motor learning abilities, yet little is known about the neural mechanisms that underlie this variability. Recent neuroimaging and electrophysiological studies demonstrate that large-scale neural dynamics inhabit a low-dimensional subspace or manifold, and that learning is constrained by this intrinsic manifold architecture. Here, we asked, using functional MRI, whether subject-level differences in neural excursion from manifold structure can explain differences in learning across participants. We had subjects perform a sensorimotor adaptation task in the MRI scanner on 2 consecutive days, allowing us to assess their learning performance across days, as well as continuously measure brain activity. We find that the overall neural excursion from manifold activity in both cognitive and sensorimotor brain networks is associated with differences in subjects’ patterns of learning and relearning across days. These findings suggest that off-manifold activity provides an index of the relative engagement of different neural systems during learning, and that subject differences in patterns of learning and relearning are related to reconfiguration processes occurring in cognitive and sensorimotor networks.