The purpose of this paper is to compare the segment reporting disclosures under SFAS No. 131 with those reported the previous year under SFAS No. 14. Under SFAS No. 131, firms are required to report segments consistent with the way in which management organizes the business internally. In addition, the accounting items disclosed for each segment are defined consistent with internal segment information used to assess segment performance. For many companies, this represents a significant change from the approach used to report segments under SFAS No. 14. Under SFAS No. 14, firms were required to disclose segment information by both line-of-business and geographic area with no specific link to the internal organization of the company or the measurements that were used for internal decision making. As a result, many complained that the resulting disclosures were highly aggregated and of limited use for decision-making purposes. We find that the change in segment reporting requirements under SFAS No. 131 has made a relatively significant impact on the disclosure of segment information. Over two-thirds of the sample firms have redefined their primary operating segments upon adopting SFAS No. 131. There has also been an increase in the number of firms providing segment disclosures and companies are disclosing more items for each operating segment. For enterprise-wide disclosures, the proportion of country-level geographic segment disclosures has increased, while the proportion of broader geographic area segment disclosures has decreased. However, the number of firms reporting earnings by geographic area has declined greatly as this item is no longer required to be disclosed for firms reporting on a basis other than geographic area.

In this article we investigate Japanese managers’ use of income from the sale of fixed assets and marketable securities to manage earnings. The earnings management target examined is Japanese managers’ forecasts of current–year earnings. We find a negative relation between income from asset sales and management forecast error. When current reported operating income is below (above) management's forecast of operating income, firms increase (decrease) earnings through the sale of fixed assets and marketable securities. The results hold after controlling for expected future performance, debt–to–equity ratio, size, growth, and last year's income from asset sales.

Prior research on publicly traded U.S. firms provides evidence that managers engage in classification shifting to opportunistically manage 'core' earnings. We extend this line of research in a broader international setting, by examining (1) whether the level of investor protection affects managers' decisions to engage in classification shifting behavior and (2) whether coverage by financial analysts mitigates this behavior. Based on an international sample of firms from 40 countries, we observe evidence consistent with classification shifting in both strong and weak investor protection countries using four separate measures of investor protection. We then explore the potential monitoring role of financial analysts in mitigating classification shifting. We provide evidence that higher financial analyst following mitigates classification shifting, primarily in weak investor protection countries. Overall, our results provide evidence of classification shifting in a broad international setting and evidence of financial analysts influence in reducing this form of earnings management.

We find that analyst forecasts of earnings per share occur in nickel intervals at a much greater frequency than do actual earnings per share. Analysts who round their earnings per share forecasts to nickel intervals exhibit characteristics of analysts who are less informed, exert less effort, and have fewer resources. Rounded forecasts are less accurate and the negative relation between rounding and forecast accuracy increases as the rounding interval increases from nickel to dime, quarter, half-dollar, and dollar. An examination of announcement period returns reveals that market expectations more closely align with consensus forecasts including rounded forecasts and then correct toward the more accurate consensus forecasts excluding rounded forecasts. Finally, exclusion of rounded forecasts decreases forecast dispersion.