We examine the improvements in forecast accuracy that result from analysts' visits to listed companies. We find that company visits significantly enhance the accuracy of the analysts' earnings forecasts for those companies. The benefit from company visits is more pronounced for companies that are more neglected or less accessible and for brokerage firms that face less pressure for optimistic forecasts from buy‐side clients. Our results are robust and remain significant after controlling for endogeneity and selection bias. Overall, our findings show that private interactions with company management provide analysts with an informational advantage and suggest that company visits facilitate the mosaic approach to information acquisition.

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This study investigates the effect of politically connected independent directors on a firm's likelihood of committing fraud in China. We classify the political backgrounds of independent directors into three categories based on their employment histories: local background, central background, and local and central background. Using corporate fraud data from 2000 to 2014, we find that independent directors with local political backgrounds significantly reduce the likelihood of a firm committing fraud. Further analysis shows that locally connected independent directors are more likely to have both employment experience in regulatory agencies and financial/accounting/law expertise.

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