The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) mail facility in Landover, Maryland, was contaminated with Bacillus anthracis spores as a result of the 2001 anthrax bioterrorism attacks through the U.S. postal system. Surface environmental sampling within the facility indicated that the contamination was due to receipt of mail that had come in contact with Bacillus anthracis spores from the source letters at the Brentwood postal facility in Washington, DC. The DOJ adopted a two-pronged approach for remediating the facility, using aqueous chlorine dioxide to decontaminate hard, nonporous surfaces and paraformaldehyde to fumigate two pieces of mail equipment. Before the start of the remediation activities, all porous materials were removed from the mail area. Since all postremediation environmental samples were negative for growth of Bacillus anthracis spores, the remediation was judged to be effective. The facility remained closed for almost 4(1/2) months. The cleanup activities took about 2(1/2) months, with source reduction activities being the most time-consuming. Of the seven facilities that performed fumigations to remediate Bacillus anthracis contamination, the DOJ mail facility was the second building to be reopened.

Since the 2001 attacks in which Bacillus anthracisspores were mailed to various media offices and two U.S. Senators, considerable interest has focused on developing estimates of the risk of contracting inhalational anthrax from exposure to such spores. Credible risk estimates would have significant utility in establishing future cleanup goals for contaminated sites. To perform a meaningful risk assessment, one needs sufficient data to identify the hazards, conduct dose-response assessment, and assess exposure. This report reviews the existing data on mortality produced by Bacillus anthracisspores in laboratory animals and humans. In particular, it focuses on the 11 cases of inhalational anthrax resulting from the 2001 attacks and their impact on hazard identification activities. It also addresses factors that may contribute to increased risk among exposed populations and the sources of uncertainty in dose response analysis. The article examines the state of the science for assessing exposure levels to Bacillus anthracis spores and concludes that significant challenges exist to performing robust assessments of risk. This conclusion supports the policy position of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) that there should be no growth of Bacillus anthracis spores from all postremediation environmental samples, for the cleanup of a site to be judged effective and for that site to be considered safe for reoccupancy. This has been the ultimate criterion for efficacy of cleanups performed in response to the 2001 anthrax attacks.

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