RESUME: Cet article explore les liens entre /a Wissenschaftslehre fWLJ de Fichte, en 1794-1795, et ses Fondements du droit naturel fGrundlage des Naturrechts -GNR,) de 1796-1797. Nous examinons lafacon dont le concept de reciprocite dans WL aide a expliquer la pensee developpeepar Fichte dansGNR au sujet de I'action intersubjective et de la sphere du droit, et montrons que certaines difficultes conceptuelles dans le premier texte expliquent des tensions irresolues dans le second. Hans-Jiirgen Verweyen a identifie une conception large et une conception etroite de I'intersubjectivite dans GNR, la premiere impliquant la reciprocite comme causalite mutuelle, tandis que la seconde iimplique comme limitation mutuelle. Pour expliquer cette dualite, nous entreprenons une analyse detaillee de I 'action reciproque dans WL, etablissant d'abord sa place et sa fonction dans I'idealisme critique de Fichte, et procedant ensuite a I'examen de son application a I'intersubjectivite juridique dans GNR. Cette approche clarifie egalement le rapport de Fichte a Kant et a Hegel.The Wissenschaftslehre of 1794 1 is an asymmetrical book. The question it addresses is the relation of freedom to objective necessity. Fichte asks how the self can operate on the not-self, or vice versa, when they are entirely opposed to each other (1,143). He divides his answer into a theoretical and a practical part, of unequal complexity and comprehensiveness. The function of the theoretical part is to demonstrate the possibility of representa-Dialogue XXXVIII (1999), 271-96 © 1999 Canadian Philosophical Association /Association canadienne de philosophie 272 Dialogue tion of an object which is external to the subject; this, Fichte says, is the task of all speculative philosophy (1, 155). The practical part is intended, first, to demonstrate that the object which limits free activity is (or must become) a result of free activity according to a concept or an end," and, next, to determine a causality in the self, or the I, which tends to suppress the not-I (1, 260 and note). Reason is activity, both theoretical and practical. In its theoretical capacity, it encounters the objective order as given, independently of the subject. The philosophical task is to show how the subject enters into interrelationship with external objects. As a practical force, reason requires that this objective realm must ultimately be derived from the productive action of subjectivity. The outer order is to be made consonant with freedom: the transformation of this order according to rational purposes, or, in Fichte's idiom, the elimination of the not-I, is an infinite task or striving of the self. To determine the relations of subject and object, Fichte undertakes an exhaustive analysis of the categories and concepts of activity. The Wissenschaftslehre develops these concepts (largely of Kantian origin) as they pertain to theoretical activity, or the faculty of representation, and it begins to describe the forms of practical activity, whereby subjects transform objectivity through acts ...

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La ética política de la Escuela hegeliana se caracteriza por el perfeccionismo post-kantiano, un enfoque que difiere de las teorías perfeccionistas precedentes en que tiene por objeto la promoción de la libertad y las condiciones de su ejercicio. Las ideas de actividad espontánea o iniciada por sí misma desplazan los puntos de vista antiguos de la felicidad o la prosperidad (eudaimonia), basados en concepciones fijas de la naturaleza humana. Las nuevas teorías están también pendientes de los intereses conflictivos en la sociedad civil moderna emergente y de la necesidad de transformar sus prácticas e instituciones. Dentro de este enfoque se distinguen dos variantes en la década de 1840, las de Bauer y Marx, de las cuales aquí se examinan sus respectivos compromisos normativos y metaéticos.