A new model of radicalization has appeared in Western countries since the 2010s. However, few empirical data are available to interpret the profiles of European young people who have embraced radical Islamism. Mixing qualitative/quantitative approaches, the present study is the first to explore their motives for radicalization, as well as how characteristics at baseline predicted their status at follow-up (FU). In 2014-2015, 150 individuals (mean age: 19.82 years; 101 (67.3%) females; 100 (67%) Muslim converts) were followed-up prospectively by the Centre de Prévention contre les Dérives Sectaires liées à l'Islam (CPDSI) until September 2016. Using a multiple correspondence analysis, we found that eight motivational dimensions (interest in violence; feelings of depression, responsibility, uncertainty or loneliness; experience of abuse; issues with sexuality; and poor insight) combining in eight statistical factors drove individuals towards radicalization. At FU, 95(63%) were no longer radicalized, 21(14%) were disengaged, 19(13%) were still radicalized, and 15(10%) had reached the Islamic State. Univariate and multivariate analyses found some protective factors defining individuals with developmental vulnerabilities that can be encountered in many psychopathologies. In addition, multivariate models showed that worse status at FU was predicted by being married, having married parents, having attempted to radicalize other relatives, and having a close friend or relative imprisoned before radicalization. We conclude that multidimensional efforts to de-radicalize young people are efficient, although a worse prognosis is associated with neighborhood/proximal phenomena. Prevention should target these local/proximal contexts to further prevent radicalization.

Introduction: Radicalization is a major issue in Western societies. Supposedly, there is no predefined pathway leading to radicalization. However, youth appears to be at risk for radicalization. The aim of this study was to compare the social and psychological profiles of radicalized minors and radicalized adults. Methods: This cross-sectional study is based on the first large prospective sample of young French individuals (N = 150) who aimed to join the Islamic State (IS) between 2014 and 2016. This sample included 70 adolescents (mean age 15.82 years old, SD 1.14) and 80 young adults (mean age 23.32 years, SD 4.99). We compared the two groups on their sociodemographic and psychological characteristics. Results: Radicalized minors and radicalized adults have different profiles and follow different paths in the radicalization process. Among the group of minors, there are significantly more female subjects (81.4% versus 55.0%, adj. p = 0.007) and more self-harm history before radicalization (44.3% versus 16.2%, p <0.001). In addition, there are significantly less attempts to radicalize the entourage (24.3% versus 50.0%, adj. p = 0.007), and a tendency to show less cases of radicalization among the entourage (32.9% versus 52.5%, adj. p = 0.075) and less radicalization through physical encounter (45.7% versus 65%, adj. p = 0.082). Discussion: Overall, radicalized minors appear to be more psychologically vulnerable individuals than radicalized adults. These differences highlight the importance of tailored interventions in order to prevent radicalization among vulnerable adolescents.

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From 2014 to 2016, the Centre de Prévention contre les Dérives Sectaires liées à l'Islam (CPDSI) was commissioned by the French Interior Ministry to establish the first indicators of radicalization, to come up with an experimental method for de-radicalization and to train law enforcement teams in France. A qualitative analysis of the data gathered from interviewing 809 young people prevented from joining ISIS, along with the collection of their interactions with the recruiters enabled us to identify the individualization of the recruitment pitches. Indeed, "the new radical discourse" adapts the jihadist ideology to the various emotional and cognitive needs of the young people, thereby pitching motivations tailored to their specific socio-culture and psychological profiles. The process analysis of the radicalization process sheds light on several sequential phases, which include a two-fold emotional-ideological dimension. This papers argues for a novel conceptual framework of the de-radicalizations studies and programs that take into account the link between the emotional and the ideological dimensions.

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