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The paper analyses the determinants and short-term effects of labour market reforms, using information from a novel policy compendium that covers 110 developed and developing economies between 2008 and 2014. We find that the approval of reforms is positively associated with the unemployment rate, the simultaneous implementation of fiscal consolidation measures and the presence of a fixed exchange rate regime. Differences in the results are explored by looking at the direction of reforms (i.e. increasing or decreasing legislation), temporal horizon (i.e. temporary or permanent measures) and coverage (i.e. complete or two-tier reforms); while also analysing separately reforms' determinants across domains of labour legislation (e.g. permanent contracts, collective dismissals). Finally, we find that deregulatory labour market reforms tend to increase the unemployment rate in the short run when they are approved during contractionary periods-while they have a non-significant effect when approved during periods of economic stability or expansion.

This article discusses the trajectories of pension system reforms in two of the latecomers to the EU: Bulgaria and Romania. It finds that over the past two decades, the two countries pursued increasingly dissimilar public pension reforms for managing their respective public pay-as-you-go pension systems. Using a political institutionalist theoretical framework, I argue that the divergence between the two cases is attributable to multiple factors. First, different temporary political compromises between national and international actors generated reforms that retrenched public pensions and introduced mandatory private accounts. Second, pension reforms often had unintended consequences that limited their intended impact. Third, incremental adjustments introduced by governments in response to political pressures caused alternating phases of austerity and generosity that catered to different constituencies in each country. In Romania, reform outcomes amounted to a moderately generous pension system, financed through relatively high contribution rates with a small funded component, while in the case of Bulgaria, the pension system evolved into a meagre programme, financed through low contribution rates and a larger private pillar.

This article analyses the productive strategy adopted by Renault for its Dacia plant in Romania. It proposes a detailed analysis of the conditions for the success of the Logan project – Renault’s radical approach to the concept of the low-cost automobile. We look into both market- and production-related aspects that have made the Logan work and highlight the tensions sparked by Renault’s drive to capitalize on its favourable market situation as well as the success achieved by Dacia’s workers in defending their interests. In particular, we emphasize the company governance compromises that have shaped industrial relations at Dacia over the past decades and show how in recent years the maintaining of such a compromise has come increasingly into question due to threats by automation and relocation in a context of constantly rising wages and improving working conditions. Finally, we discuss the strategic dilemmas facing both management and labour and their possible resolutions, as well as the relevance of the Dacia case for understanding the future of Central and Eastern Europe as a peripheral region attracting automotive foreign direct investments.

Attempts to replace pay‐as‐you‐go pension schemes with private funded systems came to a halt in Central and Eastern Europe after 2005. However, more recently, the region has witnessed two belated reformers: the Czech Republic and Romania. Both countries decided to partially privatize pensions despite the rising tide of evidence concerning the challenges associated with the policy. We argue that while part of the domestic political elite remained supportive of private funded pensions, the difficulties experienced by earlier reformers and reduced support from International Financial Institutions led to the adoption of small funded pension pillars. Such cautious attempts at privatization might become more common in the future as large reforms have proven politically unsustainable.