Resident duty hours have been restricted to 80 per week, a limitation thought to increase patient safety by allowing adequate sleep. Yet decreasing work hours increases the number of patient exchanges (so-called "handoff") at the end of shifts. WHERE ARE WE NOW?: A greater frequency of handoff leads to an increased risk of physician error. Information technology can be used to minimize that risk. WHERE DO WE NEED TO GO?: A computer-based expert system can alleviate the problems of data omissions and data overload and minimize asynchrony and asymmetry. A smart system can further prompt departing physicians for information that improves their understanding of the patient's condition. Likewise, such a system can take full advantage of multimedia; generate a study record for self-improvement; and strengthen the interaction between specialists jointly managing patients. HOW DO WE GET THERE?: There are impediments to implementation, notably requirements of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act; medical-legal ramifications, and computer programming costs. Nonetheless, the use of smart systems, not to supplant physicians' rational facilities but to supplement them, promises to mitigate the risks of frequent patient handoff and advance patient care. Thus, a concerted effort to promote such smart systems on the part of the Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education (the source of the duty hour restrictions) and the Association of American Medical Colleges (representing medical schools and teaching hospitals) may be effective. We propose that these organizations host a contest for the best smart handoff systems and vigorously promote the winners.

The current medical malpractice system is broken. Many patients injured by malpractice are not compensated, whereas some patients who recover in tort have not suffered medical negligence; furthermore, the system's failures demoralize patients and physicians. But most importantly, the system perpetuates medical error because the adversarial nature of litigation induces a so-called "Culture of Silence" in physicians eager to shield themselves from liability. This silence leads to the pointless repetition of error, as the open discussion and analysis of the root causes of medical mistakes does not take place as fully as it should. In 1993, President Clinton's Task Force on National Health Care Reform considered a solution characterized by Enterprise Medical Liability (EML), Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR), some limits on recovery for non-pecuniary damages (Caps), and offsets for collateral source recovery. Yet this list of ingredients did not include a strategy to surmount the difficulties associated with each element. Specifically, EML might be efficient, but none of the enterprises contemplated to assume responsibility, i.e., hospitals and payers, control physician behavior enough so that it would be fair to foist liability on them. Likewise, although ADR might be efficient, it will be resisted by individual litigants who perceive themselves as harmed by it. Finally, while limitations on collateral source recovery and damages might effectively reduce costs, patients and trial lawyers likely would not accept them without recompense. The task force also did not place error reduction at the center of malpractice tort reform -a logical and strategic error, in our view. In response, we propose a new system that employs the ingredients suggested by the task force but also addresses the problems with each. We also explicitly consider steps to rebuff the Culture of Silence and promote error reduction. We assert that patients would be better off with a system where physicians cede their implicit "right to remain silent", even if some injured patients will receive less than they do today. Likewise, physicians will be happier with a system that avoids blame-even if this system placed strict requirements for high quality care and disclosure of error. We therefore conceive of de facto trade between patients and physicians, a Pareto improvement, taking form via the establishment of "Societies of Quality Medicine." Physicians working within these societies would consent to onerous processes for disclosing, rectifying and preventing medical error. Patients would in turn contractually agree to assert their claims in arbitration and with limits on recovery. The role of plaintiffs' lawyers would be unchanged, but due to increased disclosure, discovery costs would diminish and the likelihood of prevailing will more than triple. This article examines the legal and policy issues surrounding the establishment of Societies of Quality Medicine, particularly the issues of contracting over liability, and outlines a means of overcoming ...

BackgroundHip fractures are common and serious injuries in the geriatric population. Obtaining informed consent for surgery in geriatric patients can be difficult due to the high prevalence of comorbid cognitive impairment. Given that virtually all patients with hip fractures eventually undergo surgery, and given that delays in surgery are associated with increased mortality, we argue that there are select instances in which it may be ethically permissible, and indeed clinically preferable, to initiate surgical treatment in cognitively impaired patients under the doctrine of presumed consent. In this paper, we examine the boundaries of the license granted by presumed consent and use the example of geriatric hip fracture to build an ethical framework for understanding the doctrine of presumed consent.DiscussionThe license to act under presumed consent requires three factors: patient incapacity, clinical urgency and clarity on the correct course of action. All three can apply to geriatric hip fracture. The typical patient frequently lacks capacity. Delays in initiating surgical treatment are associated with markedly increased mortality rates. Last, there appears to be consensus that surgery is the preferred treatment. Nonetheless, because there is a window of safe delay during which treating physicians can stabilize the patient, address reversible causes of cognitive impairment and identify surrogate decision makers, presumed consent should be invoked only as a method of last resort.ConclusionsA medical situation need not be characterized by risk of imminent and certain death for presumed consent to be relevant. Rather, there are two distinct windows that must be considered: the time interval in which action may be delayed without danger, and the time interval needed to obtain a better form of consent. Presumed consent is appropriate only when the latter exceeds the former.

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