No abstract

No abstract

In the run-up to the First World War, the Navy League was the main focus for navalist propaganda and the supporters of British sea power. It campaigned vigorously and noisily for the maintenance of British naval supremacy until the end of the First World War. However, by the time of the Washington naval conference in late 1921, the League's polices had been radically changed. As a result, by the winter of 1921-2, the Navy League's leadership was focused on internal dissent and revolt, rather than on the impact of the Washington Naval Treaty. What happened to the Navy League between 1919 and the summer of 1922 gives an insight into not only the collapse of British navalism but also the problems facing lobbying organizations as they attempt to adapt to changing circumstances.

No abstract

The idea that the British faced a 'crisis' which threatened their ability to use convoys to supply themselves with food and war materials in the Battle of the Atlantic during March 1943 is well established in the historical literature. This article, however, will argue that the concept of such a crisis is a myth. Through an examination of contemporary documents, statistics, and the actions of the British political and naval leadership, the article will show that March 1943 was not the crisis of the battle and that decisions which have been seen as responding to the crisis were caused by other considerations.