Recent developments in artificially generating gametes via in vitro gametogenesis (IVG) from induced pluripotent stem cells (iPSCs) and their successful application for reproduction in animals strongly suggest that soon these methods could also be used in human reproduction. Hikabe et al. have proven the successful reproductive use of artificial gametes in mice. 1 Also, the creation of "cross-sex gametes," i.e., female gametes artificially generated from male cells or vice versa, does not seem too far-fetched from the current state of research. 2 These technologies could facilitate unprecedented reproductive options should they prove to be applicable to human cells and organisms. These innovations seem to promise novel possible ways of procreating like "single reproduction," i.e., the conception of an oocyte with a sperm derived from the same individual, and "multiplex parenting," i.e., the generation of embryos bearing the genetic information of more than two individuals. Also, the opportunity of having genetically related children could emerge for couples with certain kinds of infertility, same-sex couples, and women after menopause. Gametes could even be derived from deceased individuals and used for procreation. These mostly unfamiliar circumstances urge us to ethically reflect upon these options at an early stage. The reproductive sphere of life is commonly thought to have a special value because of its high relevance in many people's lives. The significance of personal reproductive choice provides a basis for certain claims, e.g., the provision of therapy for infertile couples. Different normative concepts claim to provide theoretical justification of these commonly shared beliefs. Key importance is oftentimes assigned to the concept of "reproductive freedom." A common ethical argument holds that, if an act falls within the scope of reproductive freedom a legitimate regulation or prohibition of this act by state authority must meet a

We investigate a hitherto under-considered avenue of response for the logical pluralist to collapse worries. In particular, we note that standard forms of the collapse arguments seem to require significant order-theoretic assumptions, namely that the collection of admissible logics for the pluralist should be closed under meets and joins. We consider some reasons for rejecting this assumption, noting some prima facie plausible constraints on the class of admissible logics which would lead a pluralist admitting those logics to resist such closure conditions.