<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: left; margin: 0cm 0cm 0pt;" align="left"><span class="text"><span style="font-family: ";Arial";,";sans-serif";; font-size: 9pt;">The use of signal processing techniques to protect wireless transmissions is proposed as a way to secure wireless networks at the physical layer. This approach addresses a unique weakness of wireless networks whereby network traffic traverses a public wireless medium making traditional boundary controls ineffective. Specifically, a randomized array transmission scheme is developed to guarantee wireless transmissions with inherent low-probabilityof-interception (LPI). In contrast to conventional spread spectrum or data encryption techniques, this new method exploits the redundancy of transmit antenna arrays for deliberate signal randomization which, when combined with channel diversity, effectively randomizes the eavesdropper’s signals but not the authorized receiver’s signals. The LPI of this transmission scheme is analyzed via proving the indeterminacy of the eavesdropper’s blind deconvolution. Extensive simulations and some preliminary experiments are conducted to demonstrate its effectiveness. The proposed method is useful for securing wireless transmissions, or for supporting upper-layer key management protocols.</span></span><span style="font-family: ";Arial";,";sans-serif";; font-size: 9pt;"></span></p>

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To facilitate monitoring and management, modern Implantable Medical Devices (IMDs) are often equipped with wireless capabilities, which raise the risk of malicious access to IMDs. Although schemes are proposed to secure the IMD access, some issues are still open. First, pre-sharing a long-term key between a patient's IMD and a doctor's programmer is vulnerable since once the doctor's programmer is compromised, all of her patients suffer; establishing a temporary key by leveraging proximity gets rid of pre-shared keys, but as the approach lacks real authentication, it can be exploited by nearby adversaries or through man-in-the-middle attacks. Second, while prolonging the lifetime of IMDs is one of the most important design goals, few schemes explore to lower the communication and computation overhead all at once. Finally, how to safely record the commands issued by doctors for the purpose of forensics, which can be the last measure to protect the patients' rights, is commonly omitted in the existing literature. Motivated by these important yet open problems, we propose an innovative scheme e-SAFE, which significantly improves security and safety, reduces the communication overhead and enables IMD-access forensics. We present a novel lightweight compressive sensing based encryption algorithm to encrypt and compress the IMD data simultaneously, reducing the data transmission overhead by over 50% while ensuring high data confidentiality and usability. Furthermore, we provide a suite of protocols regarding device pairing, dual-factor authentication, and accountability-enabled access. The security analysis and performance evaluation show the validity and efficiency of the proposed scheme.