Processing were significantly related to GPA and scores on the American College Testing (ACT) Program Assessment. Thus, the successful student seems to process information in depth and encode it elaboratively, while simultaneously retaining the details of the original information. Unexpectedly, the Study Methods scale demonstrated a small but significant negative relationship with ACT scores. A path analysis suggested that the effects which Fact Retention and Elaborative Processing have upon GPA are mainly direct, while the effect of SynthesisAnalysis is mostly interpreted by ACT. Recent laboratory studies in the areas of human learning and memory (e.g., Craik & Tulving, 1975) have demonstrated that the way in which a person first processes a given piece of information plays a major role in determining the probability that the information will be remembered. Schmeck, Ribich, and Ramanaiah (1977) developed the Inventory of Learning Processes (ILP) in an attempt to assess individual differences in some of these information-processing habits. Schmeck et al. demonstrated that the variables assessed by their instrument related to laboratory performance in a manner similar to that which had previously been reported by researchers who were experimentally manipulating the subjects' information-processing activities. The present study was designed to examine the relationships between the information-processing habits assessed by the ILP and performance in nonlaboratory, educational settings as assessed by college grade-point average (GPA) and college entrance examination scores of the American College Testing (ACT) Assessment.The ILP contains the following four scales: Synthesis-Analysis (assessing deep, as opposed to superficial, information processing); Elaborative Processing (assessing elaborative, as opposed to verbatim, information processing); Fact Retention (assessing attention to details and specifics as opposed to generalities); and Study Methods (assessing repetitive, drill-andpractice habits of processing information). Laboratory studies employing the ILP (Ribich, 1976; Schmeck et al., 1977) have demonstrated that the Synthesis-Analysis, Elaborative Processing, and Fact Retention scales do relate to learning and memory. However, the fourth ILP scale, Study Methods, has not consistently related to performance in the laboratory. Thus, the present authors predicted that groups of

Three experiments are reported investigating whether the decreasing recall over trials in the Brown-Peterson paradigm-proactive inhibition (PI)-• derives from encoding or storage (availability) differences between items or from retrieval (accessibility) differences. In the first experiment, the first, second, third, or fourth item was repeated after three, five, or seven intervening trials for different groups of subjects. Recall of the repeated item decreased as a function of trial of initial presentation and spacing of repetitions. The second experiment demonstrated that the differences in repeateditem recall were not attributable to the different probabilities of recalling the first presentation. The third experiment indicated that prior-item recall does not affect the availability of succeeding items. In none of the experiments was there any evidence of PI in final free recall. It was argued that final free recall is inappropriate for the interpretation of PI effects. An encoding hypothesis of PI development is discussed.

No abstract

Five blocks of three Brown-Peterson trials with a different category of words in each block were presented to three groups of subjects, differentiated on the basis of their recall requirements. Two groups recalled words immediately after each block presentation and attempted to identify the trial of presentation of the words they recalled. One group gave initial Brown-Peterson recall and the other did not. A third group gave only Brown-Peterson recall with no block recall. All groups were given a final recall test of the words from all blocks. Standard proactive interference (PI) and PI release across blocks was observed in initial recall. On block recall Trial 1 words were better recalled than were Trial 2 and 3 words. Subjects could identify the trial of presentation for 75% of the Trial 1 words but only 56% of the Trial 2 and 3 words they recalled on block recall. These results were interpreted as indicating distinctive encoding 'of first-trial words within a block of related trials, which enhanced their discriminability from later trial words and made them more available for recall.Recent reviews have attributed the development and release from proactive interference (PI) in short-term memory primarily to retrieval processes (e.g., Crowder, 1976, pp. 200-215; Klatzky, 1980, pp. 141-150). In this view items presented on earlier trials exert a detrimental effect on recall because of difficulties in discriminating current from earlier presented items (Bennett, 1975;Gardiner, Craik, & Birtwistle, 1972;Loftus & Patterson, 1975) or because of increased difficulty in generating or calling the current items to mind (Dillon & Bittner, 1975;Dillon & Thomas, 1975;Watkins & Watkins, 1975). However, as we stressed in an earlier article (Radtke & Grove, 1977) and as pointed out by Craik (1979), attributing PI solely to encoding, storage, or retrieval processes is an oversimplification because discriminable encodings must be formed, maintained, and retrieved in order for recall to be successful. In the Brown-Peterson (1959) paradigm, successful recall not only requires information that an item has been presented, but also information that would differentiate

The authors employed a task which was actually composed of two subtasks performed in series. Error rate on the first subtask was manipulated while performance and retention on the second subtask were measured. Originallearning ofthe second subtask was accomplished via an errorless procedure while the relearning session, held 1 week later, was conducted in trial-and-error fashion. Three levels of error were imposed on the subjects during original learning, and these were factorially combined with the same three levels during the relearning session. Imposed errors on the first subtask interfered with performance on the second subtask both during the original errorless learning session and during the trial-and-error relearning session. The imposed error rate had no effect on retention. The major performance' deterioration occurred in the group that learned in the presence of a low error rate and relearned in the presence of a high error rate. The results were interpreted in terms of frustration theory.