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In this paper the meaning of “under invoicing in a real estate market” signifies that the market value of real property exceeds its record value appearing in government documentation. The purpose of this study is to identify the level of under invoicing and determine the factors that affect the under invoicing in real estate markets in Pakistan. We apply OLS and Extreme Bounds Analysis techniques to test our propositions. The statistical sample consists of 338 real estate contracts. We find that under invoicing is determined by a multiplicity of factor. These include: the capital gains tax rate, the measurable amount of corruption in the economy, the risk-free rate, a buyer’s profession, the reputation of the local housing authority, and the degree of disequilibria in regional real estate markets. Our findings are consistent with four distinct hypotheses: (a) tax evasion hypothesis, (b) widening gap hypothesis, (c) a corruption hypothesis and (d) a signaling hypothesis. The evidence suggests that higher rates of taxation and a larger statistical incidence of corruption in markets tend to be associated with a greater probability of under-invoicing. The findings of the study have practical implications for those investors who are interested in real estate markets of emerging and developing economies.

Abstract. TWO loci of discussion respecting national policies for environmental protection are synthesized. Most economic discussions are couched in terms of analytical measurements of the social benefits and costs of different policies. But most political science discussions are couched in terms of the procedural obstacles to implementation erected by special interest groups. The standard tool of marginal cost/benefit analysis is applied to reveal how the redistribution of real income among distinct special interest groups determines the extent to which those groups align themselves politically. Many of the apparent conflicts among policy objectives in the area of environmental protection, full employment, and an acceptable distribution of income, can be mitigated by means of a carefully designed program of selective law enforcement and tax‐financed subsidies.

Problem statement: There is no general theory analyzing how the time-varying cash flows of venture capitalist financing affect the likelihood of success of a new venture. This research addressed that lacuna in the literature. Approach: Research in the area of venture capital financing was needed because of the importance of new ventures as germinators of technological innovation. The research in this study developed a general economic theory quantifying the risk of venture failure associated with time-varying cash flows of financing. Each occasion when an entrepreneur made an overture to a venture capitalist to elicit a financing commitment was defined to be a distinct “solicitation event”. The series of financial commitments elicited from venture capitalists were assumed to have the characteristics of independently distributed random variables. It was assumed that the entrepreneur must secure a minimal aggregate commitment in order to ensure development of the project; failure to secure that amount caused the venture to be aborted. The theory of stochastic processes was applied to derive the practical implications as regards the risk of abortion. Results: It was shown that the aggregate financing commitment secured by an entrepreneur in a finite time had stochastic properties corresponding to those of a statistical renewal process. The research derived limiting conditions on the probability that entrepreneur’s venture will be aborted because of his failure to secure the minimal aggregate commitment. The main result was that if the number of solicitations by the entrepreneur is large and the financial commitments were independently distributed random variables with finite means and variances, the probability distribution governing venture survival is the Normal distribution. Conclusion: The study derived four analytical propositions quantifying the trade-offs between the risk and the expected return associated with venture capital financing. The policy implications of the results imply the benefits of mitigating information asymmetry. Some of the risk faced by the entrepreneurs could be attenuated if information about the risk/return preferences of venture capitalists were known to the entrepreneurs prior to solicitation. Some of the risks faced by the venture capitalists could be attenuated if information about the risk/return characteristics of the proposed investment project could be accurately and transparently communicated to the venture capitalist during the solicitation event. If either or both of these information deficits were palliated, the market for venture capital would operate more efficiently