No abstract

Using a system of three simultaneous equations, we test the predictions of Datar, Feltham, andHughes 1986 between auditor choice, earnings disclosures, and retained ownership in U.S. firms making initial public offerings of securities. Using a sample of initial public offerings between 1990 and 1997, we find that the demand for high-quality auditors increases with firm risk. Additionally, we find that auditor choice, earnings disclosure, and risk are determinants of retained ownership, which is consistent with the predictions of Datar et al. and Hughes that auditor choice and direct disclosure are substitute signals for ownership retention. Further, our results suggest that the signals chosen (i.e., retained ownership, auditor choice, and disclosure) are related through their cost structures and are chosen jointly to minimize the overall cost to the entrepreneur. fait, que la relation positive prévue entre le choix du vérificateur et le risque n'est apparente que lorsque les honoraires de vérification sont intégrés au modèle de demande, ce qui porte à conclure que les irrégularités observées sont probablement le résultat de l'omission d'une importante variable, celle des honoraires de vérification. Les tests de spécification des auteurs révèlent, de plus, que si les honoraires de vérification sont intégrés aux modèles de choix du vérificateur, la spécification simultanée s'impose si l'on veut éviter tout biais dans les estimations qui en découlent.

This paper examines the effect of Japanese corporate groupings, keiretsu, on the informativeness of earnings. Keiretsu firms maintain close financial and personal ties through cross-shareholding, credit holding, interlocking corporate directorates, and various business transactions. We propose that the strong interrelations of the keiretsu ownership structure enhance the informativeness of earnings through efficient monitoring of managerial performance. Our empirical results show that keiretsu firms have higher earnings response coefficients than those of non-keiretsu firms, the earnings response coefficient increases as the strength of the keiretsu relationship increases, and discretionary accruals by keiretsu firms are smaller than discretionary accruals of non-keiretsu firms. All of these results suggest that the monitoring ability of the keiretsu improves the informativeness of earnings.

Using a system of three simultaneous equations, we test the predictions of Datar, Feltham, and Hughes 1991 and Hughes 1986 between auditor choice, earnings disclosures, and retained ownership in U.S. firms making initial public offerings of securities. Using a sample of initial public offerings between 1990 and 1997, we find that the demand for high‐quality auditors increases with firm risk. Additionally, we find that auditor choice, earnings disclosure, and risk are determinants of retained ownership, which is consistent with the predictions of Datar et al. and Hughes that auditor choice and direct disclosure are substitute signals for ownership retention. Further, our results suggest that the signals chosen (i.e., retained ownership, auditor choice, and disclosure) are related through their cost structures and are chosen jointly to minimize the overall cost to the entrepreneur.

No abstract