idway through the most ambitious reform drive in United Nations history, it is high time to revisit and hopefully relearn some of the more painful lessons of past reform campaigns. None of this is rocket science-or string theory, to be more contemporary. The past six decades have seen dozens of reform efforts, most following recurring patterns and producing largely predictable results. As of midsummer 2005, things are not going well, but there is some light at the end of the tunnel. Two years ago, the effort started off on the wrong foot when Secretary-General Kofi Annan, with a puzzling disregard for the history and politics of the world organization, called for a "radical" overhauling of intergovernmental machinery, beginning with the Security Council. 1 Now, fortunately, member states have retaken the reins and, in their methodical, plodding, but purposeful fashion, are building a consensus on a few modest and sensible renovations. In the process, they have demonstrated both that it is their organization after all and that they are not so displeased with the current structure. The results will fall far short of the historic transformation proposed by the secretary-general. Compared to past efforts, however, the product should appear reasonably respectable. Typically, there are six steps to a cycle of UN reform. First, the secretary-general and a chorus of earnest national leaders bemoan the state of the organization, assert that profound changes in the global situation demand sweeping renovations, and call for fresh approaches and bold initiatives. As Annan warned the General Assembly, "Excellencies, we have come to a fork in the road. This may be a moment no less decisive than 1945 itself, when the United Nations was founded." 2 Presumably the gross overstatement was for dramatic effect. Second, some sort of blue-ribbon commission is assembled to add substantive depth to the instincts of the political leaders. In this case,

No abstract

No abstract

It is early for definitive assessments of RtoP's future as a policy instrument. Like a maturing child, we know more about its talents and aptitudes than about how they will be nurtured or stunted in the years ahead. The generally positive dialogue in the General Assembly in July 2011 suggests that the Member States understand the difference between a principle and the tactics to implement it. Building on conceptual and political progress, the United Nations is applying RtoP perspectives to a growing number of situations. In five of these, it appears to have helped save lives. Big challenges and uncertainties lie ahead, however. Perceptions of RtoP's political clout are proving to be a mixed blessing, while questions of selectivity, sovereignty, and possible misuse remain. Five near-term priorities are identified.

It is commonly asserted that the chief obstacle to advancing acceptance of the responsibility to protect (RtoP) is the reluctance of developing countries to compromise their sovereignty. Th is paper argues, instead, that both developing and some of the more powerful developed countries have concerns about the implications of RtoP for their sovereignty. Th e former are more likely to be concerned about territorial sovereignty and the latter about decision-making sovereignty. Both sets of concerns were openly expressed during the debates leading up to the consensus at the 2005 World Summit on RtoP. Th at consensus was facilitated by the fact that the wording of the relevant provisions of its Outcome Document took both types of reservations about sovereignty into account. Th e paper argues that the recognition that countries of the North and the South tend to be more united than divided by their determination to preserve their sovereignty should facilitate eff orts to achieve consensus on how to operationalise and implement the responsibility to protect.