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Note on the Psychology of Fishes' ('99), and 'The Mental Life of the Monkeys' ('01). I have added a theoretical paper, 'The Evolution of the Human Intellect,' virhich appeared in the Popular Science Monthly in 1901, and which was a direct outgrowth of the experimental work. I am indebted to the management of the Psychological Review, and that of the American Naturalist and Popular ScienA Monthly, for permission to reprint the three shorter papers. animal learning.

The Social Consciousness of Animals, io3 \yÎ nteraction, Applications to Pedagogy, Anthropology, etc., Conclusion, ANIMAL INTELLIGENCE: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF THE ASSOCIATIVE PROCESSES IN ANIMALS. This monograph is an attempt at an explanation of the nature of the process of association in the animal mind. Inasmuch as there have been no extended researches of a character similar to the present one either in subject-matter or experimental method, it is necessary to explain briefly its standpoint. Our knowledge of the mental life of animals equals in the main our knowledge of their sense-powers, of their instincts or reactions performed without experience, and of their reactions which are built up by experience. Confining our attention to the latter we find it the opinion of the better observers and analysts that these reactions can all be explained by the ordinary associative processes without aid from abstract, conceptual, inferential thinking. These associative processes then, as present in animals' minds and as displayed in their acts, are my subject-matter. Any one familiar in even a general way with the literature of comparative psychology will recall that this part of the field has received faulty and unsuccessful treatment. 8 E. L. THORNDTKE. course of life. They mean simply the connection of a certain act with a certain situation and resultant pleasure, and this general type of association is found throughout the animal's life normally. The muscular movements required are all such as might often be required of the animal. And yet it will be noted that the acts required are nearly enough like the acts of the anecdotes to enable one to compare the results of experiment by this method with the work of the anecdote school. Finally, it may be noticed that the method lends itself readily to experiments on imitation. We may now start in with the description of the apparatus and of the behavior of the animals.D escription of Apparatus. The shape and general apparatus of the boxes which were used for the cats is shown by the accompaning drawing of box K. Unless special figures are given, it should be understood that each box is approximately 20 inches long by 15 broad by 12 high. Except where mention is made to the contrary, the door was pulled open by a weight attached to a string which ran over a pulley and was fastened to the door, just as soon as the > The experiments now to be described were for the most part made in the Psychological Laboratory of Columbia University during the year 'gy-'gS, but a tew of them were made in connection with a general preliminary investigation of an.mal psychology undertaken at Harvard University in the previous year.

THE STUDY OF CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE STUDY OF BEHAVIOR i ANIMAL INTELLIGENCE 20 'Imitation/ 'invention' and 'practice' almost inevitably refer to behavior observed from the outside. 1 Perception,' ' attention,' ' memory,' ' abstraction,' 'reasoning' and 'will' are samples of the many terms which illustrate both ways of studying human and animal minds. That an animal perceives an object, say, the sun, may mean either that his mental stream includes an awareness of that object distinguished from the rest of the visual field; or that he reacts to that object as a unit. 'Attention ' may mean a clearness, f ocalness, of the mental state ; or an exclusiveness and devotion of the total behavior. It may, that is, be illustrated by the sharpness of objects illumined by a shaft of light, or by the behavior of a cat toward the bird it stalks. 'Memory' may be consciousness of certain objects, events or facts; or may be the permanence of certain tendencies in either thought or action. 'To recognize' may be to feel a certain familiarity and surety of being able to progress to certain judgments about the thing recognized ; or may be to respond to it in certain accustomed and appropriate ways. 'Abstraction ' may refer to ideas of qualities apart from any consciousness of their concrete accompaniments, and to the power of having such ideas ; or to responses to qualities irrespective of their concrete accompaniments, and to the power of making such responses. 'Reasoning' may be said to be present when certain sorts of consciousness, or when certain sorts of behavior, are present. An account of 'the will' is an account of consciousness as related to action or an account of the actions themselves. i Not only in psychological judgments and psychological terms, but also in the work of individual psychologists, this twofold content is seen. Amongst writers in this country, for example, Titchener has busied himself almost '' the sum total of human experience considered as dependent upon the experiencing person," to the self as conscious, or to a connection-system known to many observers and born and bred in the animal's body. Reason in Common Sense, p. 154 ff. CHAPTER II ANIMAL INTELLIGENCE; AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF THE ASSOCIATIVE PROCESSES IN ANIMALS 1 THIS monograph is an attempt at an explanation of the nature of the process of association in the animal mind. Inasmuch as there have been no extended researches of a character similar to the present one either in subject-matter or experimental method, it is necessary to explain briefly its standpoint. Our knowledge of the mental life of animals equals in the main our knowledge of their sense-powers, of their instincts or reactions performed without experience, and of their reactions which are built up by experience. Confining our attention to the latter, we find it the opinion of the better observers and analysts that these reactions can all be explained by the ordinary associative processes without aid from abstract, conceptual, inferential thinking. These associative processes then, as...

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