Humans are social animals, but not everyone will be mindful of others to the same extent. Individual differences have been found, but would social mindfulness also be shaped by one’s location in the world? Expecting cross-national differences to exist, we examined if and how social mindfulness differs across countries. At little to no material cost, social mindfulness typically entails small acts of attention or kindness. Even though fairly common, such low-cost cooperation has received little empirical attention. Measuring social mindfulness across 31 samples from industrialized countries and regions (n = 8,354), we found considerable variation. Among selected country-level variables, greater social mindfulness was most strongly associated with countries’ better general performance on environmental protection. Together, our findings contribute to the literature on prosociality by targeting the kind of everyday cooperation that is more focused on communicating benevolence than on providing material benefits.

The “social insurance” hypothesis posits that individuals join cooperative groups and share resources in order to reduce environmental risk. Despite its significance for explaining cooperative groups' formation, in small‐scale and in developing societies, the hypothesis has been subjected to little experimental testing. The present research is designed to examine the relative weight of the motivation for social insurance compared with other psychological motivations for sharing risk. We conducted two studies to test the tendency to share risk under different risk conditions and for groups of different sizes. A third experiment extends the risk‐sharing research to situations involving losses instead of gains. The findings of the first two studies lend strong support to the risk‐sharing hypothesis in the gain domain. For the loss domain, the results of the third experiment demonstrate an intriguing shift from strong reluctance to join groups under lower risk, to ubiquitous readiness to join groups under higher risk. We discuss these results in light of prospect theory and decisions from experience. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Installing software updates is one of the most important security actions that people can take to protect their computer systems. However, people often delay installing updates. Why would people delay installation of security updates, knowing that these updates may reduce the risk of information loss from attacks? In a laboratory experiment, we studied how people learn to make update decisions from past experiences. In a simulated “work” environment, participants could defend against low probability and high impact losses, by installing a security update. The cost of updates was variable; participants could update immediately for a high cost or wait to update for free, risking increased exposure to attacks and losses. Thus, the optimal decision was to update immediately when the update was made available. The results from our experiment indicate people learn from experience to delay security updates. The cost of the update and individual risk preference both significantly predicted the tendency to delay the update; people with higher willingness to take risks may be more likely to neglect to update, keeping the status quo even when it may be sub-optimal. We discuss the implications of these findings for the design of interventions to reduce delays in update installations.

The goal of this research is to clarify the conditions that trigger reluctance to take cost‐effective safety measures. We present three experiments. In two of the experiments, the participants were asked to operate a simulated system for 20 periods, each with 10 trials. They could “update the system” to eliminate the risk of a “security failure” that led to a loss of 100 points. The updating cost was either fixed (at 10 points) or variable (initially 10 points, and some probability of free—0 points—updates). The optimal strategy prescribed updating at the first opportunity. Another experiment focused on one‐shot decision under risk. The results highlight two factors that reduce the tendency to update and impair performance: cost variability and prechoice experience. Importantly, we show that the negative impact of cost variability is the product of two tendencies. First, experiencing periods with free updates slowed learning to select the optimal policy. Second, in many cases, the participants behaved as if they plan to update when the cost of updating is low but forget to do so. The results suggest that security can be enhanced by asking users to select a default updating policy before gaining experience and by replacing “free updates” with automatic updates. Information concerning the existence of automatic updates reduced manual updating, but this effect was eliminated by experience.