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Since the publication of the Bass model in 1969, research on the modeling of the diffusion of innovations has resulted in a body of literature consisting of several dozen articles, books, and assorted other publications. Attempts have been made to reexamine the structural and conceptual assumptions and estimation issues underlying the diffusion models of new product acceptance. The authors evaluate these developments for the past two decades. They conclude with a research agenda to make diffusion models theoretically more sound and practically more effective and realistic.

A number of issues that relate to the desirability and implications of new venture financing are examined within a principal-agent framework that captures the essence of the relationship between entrepreneurs and venture capitalists. The model suggests: (1) As long as the skill levels of entrepreneurs are common knowledge, all will choose to involve venture capital investors, since the risk sharing provided by outside participation dominates the agency relationship that is created. (2) The less able entrepreneurs will choose to involve venture capitalists, whereas the more profitable ventures will be developed without external participation because of the adverse selection problem associated with asymmetric information. (3) If a costly signal is available that conveys the entrepreneur's ability, some entrepreneurs will invest in such a signal and then sell to investors; these entrepreneurs, however, need not be the more able ones. The implications for new venture financing of these and other findings are discussed and illustrated by example.entrepreneurship, venture capital, adverse selection, moral hazard, risk reduction