Abstract2010 was a turbulent year for labour relations in China. The wave of strikes sparked by the Honda workers has highlighted the urgent need for trade union reform and workplace collective bargaining. In response to this turbulence, the Chinese government has stepped up efforts to promote the practice of collective bargaining, which had been neglected under the existing “individual rights-based” labour regulatory framework. In the midst of rapid social and policy changes, this article aims to examine the effect of labour strikes on the development of collective bargaining in China. The authors argue that, driven by growing labour protests, the collective negotiation process in China is undergoing a transition, from “collective consultation as a formality,” through a stage of “collective bargaining by riot,” and towards “party state-led collective bargaining.” This transition, however, is unlikely to reach the stage of “worker-led collective bargaining” in the near future.

Many Western scholars have regarded union democracy and elections as affairs that are internal to trade unions and unconnected with outside forces. Going beyond the mainstream union-centred approach, this study critically assesses one significant type of union election that has been emerging in China since 2010 and that has been driven by different forces from previous elections. Previous workplace union elections had been 'top-down' -initiated by the party-state or its apparatuses, or else transnational corporation-induced -but this newer type of election has been driven by workers' strikes. This study illustrates howthe dynamics among the quadripartite actors -party-state, higher-level trade unions, capital and labour -have shaped these strike-driven elections. Contrary to the claim that these elections have been 'direct' and 'democratic', our case studies show that they have been indirect and quasi-democratic in nature.

Based on a case study of the Honda workers' strike and its impact on workplace industrial relations, this article explores the potential of and barriers to workplace trade union reform in China. A rise in workers' collective actions has put political pressure on the All China Federation of Trade Unions to promote effective trade unionism and create a vital foundation for exercising democratic union representation in the workplace. The main barrier to effective workplace unionism, however, is the lack of external support for workers' unionization efforts. On the one hand, the lower-level local trade unions fail to comply with their legal responsibility because of their bureaucratic nature and structural integration into the patron-client relationship between the local state and the global capital. On the other hand, support for workers from civil society is handicapped by the party-state's opposition to independent labour organizing. This dilemma has forced the higher trade union federation to intervene directly in workplace trade union reform and promote state-led wage bargaining.

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