The military covenant is a set of morally binding expectations marking the exchange between military, society, and the state. Its base is the military’s duality: like other large public institutions delivering services and its uniqueness in holding the monopoly over the use of legitimate organized state violence. The covenant is a form of relational (not transactional) contract based on trust between, and a long-term orientation of, partners; it both orders and displays these relations thereby offering both prescriptions for action and discursive means to legitimate them. The covenant can be used as an analytical (not normative) concept for theoretical development in three areas: social change and society-military ties, processual aspects of agreements between individuals and groups and the armed forces, and links between society-military ties and the social contract and social cohesion. We use the case of Estonia to illustrate the theoretical potential of the military covenant.

While past decades Western societies have been shifting from mandatory military service toward all-volunteer forces, a number of them have retained conscription. A growing emphasis on individualization and neoliberalist ideas results in a tension for youths between fulfilling a duty and the need for constant self-development. We argue that a central mechanism for addressing this challenge is convertibility, the ability to use competencies gained in one sphere in another, and thus increasing the individual value of conscription for recruits. By linking convertibility to societal expectations, we demonstrate how societies shape ideas of what is convertible and why, and by relating convertibility to agency and motivation, we extend the concept to the individual level. We argue that as material rewards are limited and conscripts cannot rely on occupational motivations, convertibility has a potential to increase the value of conscription for recruits and enable them to combine institutional motivators with utilitarian motives.

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