Do private property rights mitigate overexploitation of common pool resources, and if so, under which circumstances? In this paper, we examine the effects of private property rights on the status of marine fisheries by combining data on ecological, economic and institutional characteristics into a panel data set, spanning over 50 years, 170 exclusive economic zones and 800 species. To address the inherent endogeneity problem of policy implementation, we employ both a differencein-differences (DiD) and instrumental variable (IV) strategy. Results from both estimations suggest that property rights lower the probability of a fish stock collapsing, but the effect varies with country and species characteristics. Specifically, we find evidence suggesting that property rights are more effective when ownership is transferable, the general level of ownership protection is strong, trade openness is high, the regenerative capacity of the resource is high, and the species value is high.

Assuming that emissions originate from the consumption of goods and services, we study the relationship between consumption-based per capita carbon footprint and per capita expenditure for Norway, using 2007 data. A two-region input-output model reveals that the consumption-based per capita carbon footprint is directly proportional to expenditure with an estimated elasticity close to unity. We show that this result is at least partly driven by a near zero-emission power sector, which leads to comparatively low emission intensities for domestically-produced goods and services.

We investigate whether positive framing increases cooperation in three social dilemmas with slightly different properties: a linear public goods (PG) game, a non-linear PG game, and a common pool resource (CPR) game. Results from our laboratory experiments show that contributions to a linear PG are higher if the externality is framed positively, rather than negatively, corroborating earlier findings by Andreoni (1995). By contrast, we find no such framing effects in the non-linear PG game or the CPR game. In these games, the best response in the material payoffs is to contribute less if others contribute more, counteracting effects of pro-social preferences. Positive framing therefore does not help to solve the tragedy of the commons.

Thus, temporal arachnoid cysts may affect visuospatial orientation and learning in a reversible manner.