The objective of this study is to empirically examine non-linear (quadratic) effect of capital structure on firm performance (Tobin's q dan ROA) and also the effect of Multiple Large Shareholder Structure (MLSS) and institutional ownership on firm performance. The sample is a non-financial company listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange with the study period 2009-2012. Data obtained from Data Stream and IDX website. Using fixed effect panel regression, this research finds that the capital structure has a quadratic (concave) effect on firm performance measured by ROE with maximum point at debt to equity of 1.95. This result indicates that the total debt that maximizes the company's performance is 1.95 of the total capital. The study also finds that increasingly large multiple shareholder structures (MLSS) will decrease firm performance, while higher institutional ownership will improve company performance.

This study aims to investigate the effect of family ownership, family leadership, and the monitoring role of the Board of Commissioners on the audit quality. This study uses a sample of non-financial companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) from 2010 to 2013. Family ownership is measured through the ultimate ownership of the company. To determine whether the company's CEO is the founder of the company, family relationship data is used on all of the company's ultimate owners. The monitoring role of the Board of Commissioners is calculated through the Asean Corporate Governance Scorecard index. Data of auditor is obtained from Center for Supervision of Financial Service (P2PK). The results showed that family ownership either through direct or indirect mechanisms tend to choose Big 4 KAP than non Big 4. While Chief Financial Officer (CFOs) from family and corporate founders tend to choose Big 4 in auditing the company. This is done to maintain the company's reputation. The results also show that the effective monitoring of the Board of Commisionners (BOC) tends to choose Big 4 auditors compared to non Big 4.

PurposeThis study aims to examine the impact of founder or descendant chief executive officers (CEOs) on the relationship between tax avoidance and firms' future risk. This issue is important because of an ongoing debate about founder and descendant CEOs' impacts, contributions and implications for firms.Design/methodology/approachThis study uses a sample of publicly listed nonfinancial Indonesian firms in 2012–2019, most of which are family firms and adhere to a two-tier governance system that was understudied in previous studies. The authors use panel-random effect data regression for the statistical analysis.FindingsThe results demonstrate that founder or descendant CEOs do not affect the positive relationship between tax avoidance and firms' future risks.Research limitations/implicationsThis research supports the upper-echelon theory, arguing that top management teams affect firms' strategic policies and outcomes.Practical implicationsCEOs play weaker roles in countries with a two-tier governance system than in a one-tier one. Additionally, in relation to Hofstede's cultural dimensions, Indonesia has collective and feminist characteristics that emphasize elements of togetherness and group so that firms reflect the firms' top management teams and not only CEOs.Originality/valueThis research fills a research gap on the role of founder and descendant CEOs in the relationship between tax avoidance and firms' future risks by analyzing firms in Indonesia, a country with a two-tier governance system and collective and feminine cultural characteristics.

This study aims to test whether the founder or descendants of CEOs have differences from professional CEOs in influencing the relationship between CEO overconfidence and tax avoidance. Overconfident CEOs have strong incentives to avoid taxes. However, the role of the founder or descendant CEOs is expected to mitigate the relationship between the CEO’s overconfidence and tax avoidance. This study used a sample of non-financial companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange in 2012–2019 and tested random effect panel data. The results of this study show that CEO-led companies that are overconfident are more driven to tax avoidance. Meanwhile, the relationship between CEO overconfidence and tax avoidance is not influenced by the presence of a descendant, founder, or professional CEO. Indonesia as one of the countries that adheres to a two tier governance system, the founder or descendant CEO is not the only significant actor in the company but based on the upper echelon theory that role of the entire company management team that influences the company’s policy strategy. This study provides implications for developing the literature regarding the relationship between CEO overconfidence and tax avoidance. However, the relationship between CEO overconfidence and tax avoidance is not influenced by the presence of the founder, descendant, or professional CEO. Likewise, this research is useful for investors, creditors, and regulators in paying attention to the characteristics of the CEO in making decisions.

Purpose In the context of a two-tier governance system, this study aims to investigate whether CEO overconfidence affects firm risk. In addition, this study examines the moderating role of the founder CEO on CEO overconfidence and firm risk. Design/methodology/approach This study uses a composite score index of CEO overconfidence with a sample of nonfinancial firms listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange from 2012 to 2019. It tests the research hypothesis with multiple linear regression analysis. Findings The findings indicate that CEO overconfidence reduces firm risk. In contrast, the founder CEO does not affect the relationship between CEO overconfidence and firm risk. Research limitations/implications This study supports the upper echelon theory that argues that firms’ top management affects firms’ outcomes and behaviors. Practical implications The top management team heavily affects firms’ outcomes and behaviors in a two-tier governance system. Furthermore, firms’ selection policy of overconfident CEOs will be improved because these CEOs can diversify firm risks more effectively. Originality/value To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study is the first to examine the role of the founder in the relationship between CEO overconfidence and firm risk.