What does it mean to teach virtue, or to learn it? We consider this question through an institutional review board (IRB) supported research study attending to student learning experiences in undergraduate ethics courses at a Catholic university with an explicit commitment to social justice. This essay draws on and interprets qualitative data concerning the outcomes of select pedagogical approaches that involve exposing students to the experiences of others: the use of narratives; participation in structured experiential learning activities; and community engagement through deep listening and facilitated dialogue. We focus our interpretation around the implications of these pedagogies in relation to student understanding of and attitudes regarding three character traits identified as “other‐regarding” virtues in theological and philosophical scholarship – altruism, compassion, and solidarity. This paper considers the implications of these pedagogies and the practical effects of different sorts of teaching strategies on students' self‐understanding as moral agents.

The contemporary revival of virtue ethics has focused primarily on retrieving central moral commitments of Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, and the Neoplatonist traditions. Christian virtue ethicists would do well to expand this retrieval further to include the writings of the Roman Stoics. This essay argues that the ethics of Jonathan Edwards exemplifies major Stoic themes and explores three noteworthy points of intersection between Stoic ethics and Edwards's thought: a conception of virtue as consent to a benevolent providence, the identification of virtue as a singular and transformative good, and an account of moral formation as simultaneously self-directed and received. Common ground between Edwards and the Stoics illustrates the value of recognizing Stoic moral thought as a philosophical framework that can enhance and undergird Christian ethicists' understandings of moral development and the nature of virtue.

No abstract

No abstract

Drawing on the work of Jonathan Edwards, this essay explores two dimensions of Reformed thought central to considering the emotions' moral significance. First, Reformed theology's singular understanding of virtue and holiness as love to God and neighbor gives rise to a distinctive account of the emotions' place in the moral life. Certain emotions are to be embraced insofar as they have the capacity to be sanctified and thereby made compatible with growth in love to God. Second, Reformed theology historically links the emotions with the will, which is subject to moral necessity. Contemporary Reformed reflection on the emotions must therefore grapple with questions about moral agency and accountability that arise from this account of necessity.In recent decades, philosophical and theological ethicists have increasingly recognized the emotions' importance to the formation and sustainment of moral character. This essay explores the Reformed tradition's potential contributions to emerging scholarly reflection on the emotions' moral significance. The work of Jonathan Edwards is a particularly compelling resource for this study, both because theological ethicists acknowledge and appreciate Edwards's distinctive understanding of virtue and because Edwards wrote in a historical context that raised unique questions about the role of emotions in