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Mercurial signatures are a useful building block for privacy-preserving schemes, such as anonymous credentials, delegatable anonymous credentials, and related applications. They allow a signature σ on a message m under a public key pk to be transformed into a signature σ′ on an equivalent message m′ under an equivalent public key pk′ for an appropriate notion of equivalence. For example, pk and pk′ may be unlinkable pseudonyms of the same user, and m and m′ may be unlinkable pseudonyms of a user to whom some capability is delegated. The only previously known construction of mercurial signatures suffers a severe limitation: in order to sign messages of length ℓ, the signer’s public key must also be of length ℓ. In this paper, we eliminate this restriction and provide an interactive signing protocol that admits messages of any length. We prove our scheme existentially unforgeable under chosen open message attacks (EUF-CoMA) under a variant of the asymmetric bilinear decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption (ABDDH).

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