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This chapter develops an account of the circumstances in which it is epistemically apt to defer to another's judgement about some topic, expressed in her testimony. This can include aesthetic and moral matters. The extent to which this compromises our epistemic autonomy is investigated, and it is argued that, by being discriminating in whom we trust, we can still maintain responsibility for our own beliefs. The supposedly ideal epistemically autonomous agent, who trusts no-one else's word, is shown to be really an irrational dogmatist.

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Some early landmarks in the recent literature are Coady (1992), Matilal and Chakrabarti (1994). Welbourne (1986). ELIZABETH FRICKERTestimony, that is communication of knowledge, through the hearer's trust in what the speaker presents as being so, can occur also when a shared language is not used literally, and when the language of the message is not fully understood by both parties-successful uptake of the intended message can still be achieved, and the same commitment to its truth incurred by the speaker. There are also non-linguistic Gricean acts which successfully communicate a message, which certainly share some features of testimony

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