No abstract

We examine how auditors respond to news coverage of their firm and evaluate the extent to which national news outlets function as a watchdog over audit firms. We find that when media coverage includes issues specific to the audit opinion (i.e., restatements, adverse internal control opinions, fraud), audit firms respond by increasing audit attention (increased fees, reporting delay, and late filings). We find that this is amplified among clients with issues similar to those discussed in the media coverage. In contrast, we find that when news coverage does not relate to audit reporting decisions, firms decrease fees and issue audit opinions sooner. Additional analyses reveal that audit firms respond to high levels of news coverage at peer firms, suggesting that firms try to preemptively manage their reputation even when they are not under direct media scrutiny, and negative news has significant costs for firms' client growth and retention. Collectively, our evidence suggests that the news media functions as an effective informal oversight mechanism of auditing firms by driving increased auditor attention and improved audit quality.

We examine the reputational impact of an audit office issuing adverse internal control opinions (adverse ICOs). While prior research has examined how clients that receive an adverse ICO respond, we focus on clients that did not receive an adverse ICO. We find that audit offices that issue more adverse ICOs experience lower growth and that this effect is stronger when the adverse ICO is associated with a more visible client or refers to an entity-level control weakness. Finally, we find that clients are less likely to select auditors with a history of issuing adverse ICOs and that auditors are able to recoup some of their lost growth when they issue fewer adverse ICOs. Our results indicate that the market for audit services penalizes auditors for disclosing information critical of management, which undermines the value of direct-to-investor auditor communications and provides insight into potential longer-term implications of the expanded auditor's report.

Regulators have long expressed concerns about auditor changes and the detrimental impact of opinion shopping on the audit market. While prior studies have examined how single-instance auditor switching impacts audit outcomes, we examine whether frequent auditor switching impacts audit outcomes. We find that more frequent auditor switching is associated with lower audit quality, but that this effect is mitigated in the presence of higher internal and external monitoring. We also find that frequently switching companies have lower audit quality than companies that switch auditors, but do not frequently switch auditors. Taken together, our evidence indicates that a subset of companies participates in frequent auditor switching and that such behavior is detrimental to the audit market. Our findings can inform regulators and practitioners about some of the ramifications of frequent auditor switching and help inform auditor switching regulations and client acceptance procedures.

Consulting service revenues recently surpassed audit revenues as the primary income source for the largest accounting firms. Since SOX limits the provision of consulting services to audit clients, this shift in revenues implies that firms and many clients likely choose between audit and consulting relationships. We explore the implications of this by developing and validating a measure of client-level consulting needs that can likely be fulfilled by accounting firms, which we refer to as “consulting opportunities.” As predicted, we find that consulting opportunities relate positively to auditor switches. We also find that consulting opportunities relate negatively to subsequent Big 4 auditor selection, the firms focusing most on consulting, but we fail to find evidence that consulting opportunities relate to deteriorations in audit quality. Together, our results suggest that legislation limiting firms’ ability to deliver consulting services to audit clients may have reduced audit market concentration without discernably impacting quality.