This paper analyzes the sources of ambivalence toward political parties and candidates. We propose and test an information-processing theory of ambivalence in which systematic processing is hypothesized to heighten partisan and candidate ambivalence. We show that ambivalence is linked to several dispositional sources of systematic processing, including individuals' information, motivation, and cognitive style. Specifically, we find that ambivalence tends to be greater among the well informed and those who are high in need for cognition while it tends to be lower among those motivated by directional goals. Collectively, our results suggest that levels of partisan and candidate ambivalence are greatest among those most likely to engage in effortful processing of information and that these effects are independent of value conflict. The results further suggest that the effects of effortful processing on ambivalence are moderated by attitude commitment.

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Using a pair of national surveys, this article analyzes the individuallevel sources of public support for Social Security privatization. Given the inherent risks associated with privatization, we argue that the political trust heuristic affords untapped theoretical leverage in explaining public attitudes toward privatization. We find that, among certain individuals, political trust plays an instrumental role in structuring privatization preferences. Political trust increases support for privatization, but only among liberals. This heterogeneity in trust's impact is best explained, we argue, by the unbalanced ideological costs imposed by the potential privatization of Social Security. Among liberals, embracing privatization requires the sacrifice of core values, thereby making political trust a potent consideration. Political trust is inconsequential among conservatives because supporting privatization requires no comparable sacrifice for them.

We examine how changes in perceptions of threat affect individuals' policy views, as well as the political implications of this relationship. We administered a survey experiment to a representative sample of the U.S. population in which we exogenously manipulated individuals' perceived likelihood of a future terrorist attack on American soil and assessed subsequent changes in support for terrorism-related public policies. We find that perceived threat substantially increases support for policies intended to reduce terrorism and that this effect is concentrated among Democrats who believe another terrorist attack is likely to occur. These results suggest that increased levels of threat following September 11th may have assisted the Bush Administration in building a bipartisan coalition for its anti-terrorism policies by attracting individuals whose predispositions may have otherwise precluded their support. More broadly, our findings demonstrate how political elites can leverage and manipulate threat to bridge partisan divisions.