Thinking is biological work and involves the allocation of cognitive resources. The aim of this study was to investigate the impact of fluid intelligence on the allocation of cognitive resources while one is processing low-level and high-level cognitive tasks. Individuals with high versus average fluid intelligence performed low-level choice reaction time tasks and high-level geometric analogy tasks. We combined behavioral measures to examine speed and accuracy of processing with pupillary measures that indicate resource allocation. Individuals with high fluid intelligence processed the low-level choice reaction time tasks faster than normal controls. The task-evoked pupillary responses did not differ between groups. Furthermore, individuals with high fluid intelligence processed the high-level geometric analogies faster, more accurately, and showed greater pupil dilations than normal controls. This was only true, however, for the most difficult analogy tasks. In addition, individuals with high fluid intelligence showed greater preexperimental pupil baseline diameters than normal controls. These results indicate that individuals with high fluid intelligence have more resources available and thus can solve more demanding tasks. Moreover, high fluid intelligence appears to be accompanied by more task-free exploration.

Inconsistent Wndings regarding the emotional Stroop eVect in healthy subjects may be explained by confounding eVects of stimulus valence and arousal, as well as individual diVerences in anxiety. We examined reaction time data in a healthy sample using the emotional Stroop task while carefully matching arousal level of positive and negative words. Independent of valence, emotional relative to neutral words elicited emotional interference, indicating that arousal determines emotional interference. Independent of valence, emotional words were better re-called and recognized than neutral words. Individual diVerences in state anxiety were associated with emotional interference, that is, emotional interference was enhanced in subjects with high state anxiety. There was no inXuence of trait anxiety. These Wndings indicate that word arousal produces emotional interference independent of valence. State anxiety exacerbates interference of emotional words by further biasing attention towards emotionally salient stimuli.

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To investigate how individual differences in moral judgment competence are reflected in the human brain, we used event-related functional magnetic resonance imaging, while 23 participants made either socio-normative or grammatical judgments. Participants with lower moral judgment competence recruited the left ventromedial prefrontal cortex and the left posterior superior temporal sulcus more than participants with greater competence in this domain when identifying social norm violations. Moreover, moral judgment competence scores were inversely correlated with activity in the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) during socio-normative relative to grammatical judgments. Greater activity in right DLPFC in participants with lower moral judgment competence indicates increased recruitment of rule-based knowledge and its controlled application during socio-normative judgments. These data support current models of the neurocognition of morality according to which both emotional and cognitive components play an important role.