The U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) enforces regulations for vessel response plans and marine transportation-related facility response plans for oil. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) enforces similar regulations for response plans for non-transportation-related facilities. Proposed USCG rules would require response plans for hazardous substances designated under the authority of the Clean Water Act (CWA). Other USCG regulations implement provisions of the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, known as MARPOL 73/78. Annex I of MARPOL 73/78 addresses petroleum pollution, while Annex II identifies and addresses Noxious Liquid Substances (NLSs). The Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Act of 2004 gives the USCG authority to require response plans for NLSs under the CWA. There is some overlap, however, in the substances that are listed as NLSs and those that are categorized as oils or designated as CWA hazardous substances. Adding NLSs to the list of substances requiring a response plan has several implications for spill prevention, preparedness, and response programs. Some facilities currently have response plans for oils and may have response plans for CWA hazardous substances in the future. Some NLSs may be hazardous substances under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) and response plans for those NLSs must be consistent with spill notification and response requirements under CERCLA. EPA and USCG On-Scene Coordinators must consider these overlapping listings when deciding on the appropriate removal actions for discharges. Facility owners and operators will need to consider their existing response plans when preparing response plans for NLSs. Under the CWA all response plans must be consistent with the National Contingency Plan and Area Contingency Plans.

Emergency response exercises are designed to evaluate the operational readiness of responders to act consistently with plans, policies, and procedures. The design and execution of an exercise includes scenario development, exercise control and simulation, documentation, critiques, and after-action reports. Representatives of government agencies and private parties participate in exercises intended to ensure the successful implementation of oil spill response plans and contingency plans. Exercise scenarios for oil spills associated with a natural hazard highlight unique problems, because natural hazards can cause spills in a number of different ways. For example, earthquakes, landslides, lightning strikes, tornados, hurricanes and other storms can affect vessels, pipelines, drilling platforms, and storage tanks. In addition, the cause of many large spills from vessels is often reported as “grounding” or “collision,” but frequently a contributing cause of these accidents is severe weather. This paper discusses the exercise objectives and special considerations for responding to oil spills caused by different types of natural hazards. Natural hazards present emergency planners with a variety of warning times, from little or no warning to days and weeks. Natural hazards have the potential to cause spills over a wide area, so coordination among several jurisdictions is particularly important. Some discharges may be even greater than an expected “worst case” spill, because an earthquake or flood can rupture multiple tanks and damage secondary containment structures. In addition, the conditions created by natural hazards can delay and hinder response efforts.

Although facilities in the United States have not been subject to major oil spills caused by intentional acts, around the world acts of war and terrorism account for a large fraction of reported major oil spills. The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 requires response plans that address a “worst case discharge;” however, the implementing regulatory agencies did not foresee the possibility of deliberate attacks that could involve multiple storage tanks or several pipeline response zones. In addition, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 highlighted the problems with the current U.S. federal response and contingency plans. The U.S. Coast Guard published a rule that requires operators of marine-transportation-related oil facilities to implement a variety of security measures. Inland facilities and pipelines are generally exempt from the security regulations; nevertheless, those facilities and pipelines can take steps to increase their own security preparedness by emulating the Coast Guard provisions. Homeland Security Presidential Directive HSPD-7, issued on December 17, 2003, identified critical infrastructure sectors and sector-specific agencies to facilitate vulnerability assessments of the sectors. The U.S. Department of Energy is responsible for coordinating the protection of critical infrastructures in the Energy Sector, which includes the production, refining, storage, and distribution of oil. In this paper, we discuss recent trends in Federal requirements and current provisions for oil industry security planning. We highlight types of major oil facilities that need to consider the possibility of a terrorist attack, as well as recommendations by industry groups. We conclude with suggested areas for industry planning improvement.