We argue that the mandatory moral bioenhancement of psychopaths is justified as a prescription of social morality. Moral bioenhancement is legitimate when it is justified on the basis of the reasons of the recipients. Psychopaths expect and prefer that the agents with whom they interact do not have certain psychopathic traits. Particularly, they have reasons to require the moral bioenhancement of psychopaths with whom they must cooperate. By adopting a public reason and a Kantian argument, we conclude that we can justify to a psychopath being the recipient of mandatory moral bioenhancement because he has a reason to require the application of this prescription to other psychopaths.

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Jonathan Quong proposes and defends the consensus, shared reasons, view of public reason. The proposal is opposed to the convergence view, defended, among others, by Gerald Gaus. The strong argument that Quong puts forward in opposition to the convergence view is represented by the sincerity argument. The present paper offers an argument that embraces a form of convergence and, at the same time, is engaged in respecting the requirement of sincerity.

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